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Abstract
We show that the security of some well-known cryptographic protocols, primitives and as-
sumptions (e.g., the Schnorr identication scheme, commitments secure under adaptive selective-
decommitment, the \one-more" discrete logarithm assumption) cannot be based on any standard
assumption using a Turing (i.e., black-box) reduction. These results follow from a general result
showing that Turing reductions cannot be used to prove security of constant-round sequentially
witness-hiding special-sound protocols for unique witness relations, based on standard assump-
tions; we emphasize that this result holds even if the protocol makes non-black-box use of the
underlying assumption.
First version from November 4, 2010. This revision contains new results on blind signatures (Section 9). Pass
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11 Introduction
Modern Cryptography relies on the principle that cryptographic schemes are proven secure based
on mathematically precise assumptions; these can be general|such as the existence of one-way
functions|or specic|such as the hardness of factoring products of large primes. The security
proof is a reduction that transforms any attacker A of the scheme into a machine that breaks the
underlying assumption (e.g., inverts an alleged one-way function). This study has been extremely
successful, and during the past four decades many cryptographic tasks have been put under rigorous
treatment and numerous constructions realizing these tasks have been proposed under a number of
well-studied complexity-theoretic hardness assumptions. But there are some well-known protocols,
primitives, and assumptions, that have resisted security reductions under well-studied assumptions:
The Schnorr identication scheme Schnorr's identication [Sch91] scheme is one of the most
well-known (the original paper is cited over 1500 time) and commonly-used identication
schemes. For instance, recent usage includes the BlackBerry Router protocol. Can the security
of this scheme, even under just a sequential attack, be based on any standard assumption?
The adaptive selective decommitment problem Assume a polynomial-time adversary re-
ceives a number of commitments and may then adaptively request openings of, say, half of
them. Do the unopened commitments still remain hiding? This problem was rst formalized
by Dwork, Naor, Reingold and Stockmeyer [DNRS03] (but according to them it arouse over 25
years ago in the context of distributed computing.)1 As noted by Dwork et al, random-oracle-
based commitment schemes easily satisfy this property. Can we construct non-interactive (or
even two-round) commitment schemes that provably satisfy this property based on any stan-
dard assumption?2
One-more inversion assumptions Can a polynomial-time algorithm A, given a prime-order
group G and a generator g for G, nd the discrete logarithm (w.r.t to the generator g) to `
\target" points y1;:::;y` 2 G if it may make `   1 queries to a discrete logarithm oracle (for
the group G and generator g)? The \one-more" discrete-logarithm assumption states that
no such algorithm exists. Assumptions of this \one-more inversion" type were introduced by
Bellare, Namprempre, Pointcheval and Semanko [BNPS03] and have been used to prove the
security of a number of practical schemes. Can the security of these type of assumptions be
based standard assumptions?
Unique Blind Signatures In 1982, Chaum [Cha82] introduced the concept of a \blind signature"|
roughly speaking, a signature scheme where a user may ask a signer S to sign a message m
while keeping the content of m secret from S|and provided its rst implementation. His
scheme is non-interactive (just as traditional signature schemes) and has the desirable prop-
erty that for every message there is a unique valid signature. Can the security of his scheme,
or more generally, any \unique non-interactive blind signature" (i.e., non-interactive blind
signature schemes with unique signatures), be based on standard assumptions?
Witness hiding of parallelized versions of classical zero-knowledge protocols It is
well-known that parallelized versions of the classic three-round zero-knowledge protocols of
1We remark that DNRS focused their treatment on a non-adaptive version of this game where the adversary must
select all the commitments to be opened up in a single shot; the general adaptive version is considered in Remark
7.1 in [DNRS03].
2Interestingly, the related question of constructing encryption schemes secure under selective decryption based on
\standard-type assumption" has recently been solved [BHY09].
2[GMR89, GMW91, Blu86] are witness indistinguishable [FS90]. As shown by Feige and Shamir
[FS90], for certain languages with multiple witnesses, they are also witness hiding under se-
quential (and even concurrent) composition. Can we prove that these protocols also are
witness hiding under sequential composition for languages with unique witnesses based on
any standard assumption?
In this paper, we present negative answers to the above questions for a very liberal denition of
\standard assumptions", if we restrict to Turing (i.e., black-box) reductions|that is, reductions
that use the alleged attacker A as a black-box.
1.1 Our Results
Our main result shows that it is impossible to (Turing) reduce any \standard assumption" to
the witness hiding under sequential composition property of certain types of constant-round ar-
guments of knowledge protocols|called \computationally special-sound" protocols|for languages
with unique witnesses. All our specic lower-bounds follow as corollaries of this result.
Following Naor [Nao03], we model a standard assumption as an arbitrary game between a (po-
tentially) unbounded challenger C, and an attacker A.3 A is said to break the assumption C if
it can make C output 1 with non-negligible probability. The only restriction we put on C is that
it communicates with A in an a priori xed polynomial number of rounds. All traditional cryp-
tographic hardness assumptions (e.g., the hardness of factoring, discrete log, etc) can be modeled
as 2-round challengers C; but also the fact that a specic protocol (P;V ) is witness-hiding under
a single (or even an a priori bounded number of) interactions can be modeled as a xed-round
challenger C.
Recall that a three-round public-coin interactive proof is said to be special-sound [CDS94],
if a valid witness to the statement x can be eciently computed from any two accepting proof-
transcripts of x which have the same rst message but dierent second messages. We consider
a relaxation of this notion|which we simply call computational special-soundness|where a) the
number of communication rounds is any constant (instead of just three), b) the extractor may
need a polynomial number of accepting transcripts (instead of just two), and c) extraction need
only succeed if the transcripts are generated by communicating with a computationally-bounded
prover. All traditional constant-round public-coin proofs of knowledge protocols (such as [GMR89,
GMW91, Blu86, Sch91], as well as instantiations of [GMW91, Blu86] using statistically-hiding
commitments) satisfy this property, and continue to do so also under parallel repetition.
Theorem 1 (Main Theorem - Informally stated). Let (P;V ) be a constant-round computationally
special-sound interactive argument with negligible error for the language L with unique witnesses.
Assume there exists a polynomial-time Turing reduction R such that RA breaks C for every A that
breaks sequential witness hiding of (P;V ). Then C can be broken in polynomial-time.
This results directly rules out Turing reductions for demonstrating sequential witness hiding
of parallelized versions of classical zero-knowledge protocols for languages with unique witnesses
based on standard assumptions. We next show that all the previously mentioned questions can be
restated in the language of \sequential witness hiding for unique witness languages", and we can
thus use our main theorem to provide negative answers also to those questions.
3In contrast to [Nao03], we do not insist that the challenger is ecient; since our aim is to prove lower bounds,
this only strengthens our results.
3Schnorr's identication scheme: To rule out Turing reductions for proving security of the
Schnorr identication scheme, note that Schnorr's protocol is a special-sound proof for a
unique witness language. Next, if Schnorr's protocol is not sequentially witness hiding, then
it cannot be a secure identication scheme: The witness in this proof is the identier's secret-
key, so if an attacker can recover it after hearing polynomially many proofs, we can trivially
violate the security of the identication scheme.
Adaptive selective decommitment: To rule out solutions to the selective-decommitment prob-
lem, we extend one of the results from [DNRS03] to show that if implementing the com-
mitment scheme in GMW's Graph 3-Coloring protocol with non-interactive (or two-round)
commitments that are secure under adaptive selective decommitment, then the resulting pro-
tocol is sequentially witness hiding for any eciently samplable hard language with unique
witnesses;4 so assuming the existence of an eciently samplable hard language with unique
witnesses, Turing reductions cannot be employed to reduce adaptive selective-decommitment
security of such commitments to any standard assumption.
One more inversion assumptions: Bellare and Palacio [BP02] have shown that the security of
the Schnorr scheme can be based on the \one-more discrete log" assumption, so by their
work, we directly get that standard assumptions cannot be Turing-reduced to the one-more
discrete log assumption. By directly constructing appropriate special-sound protocols, we
can generalize this result to rule out even weaker types of \many-more" discrete logarithm
assumptions (where we require that it is hard to nd ` inverses when having access to only `
inverses, where  > 0.) Using the same approach, we get that standard assumptions cannot
be Turing reduced to many-more variants of the RSA problem either (and more generally,
any family of certied permutations that is additive homomorphic).
Unique blind signatures: The notion of unforgeability for blind signature schemes [PS00] re-
quires that no attacker having requested ` signatures (where ` is an arbitrary polynomial)
can come up with `+1 signatures. We show that the existence of a unique non-interactive blind
signatures implies that for every polynomial `, there exists a computationally special-sound
protocol for a unique witness language that is witness hiding under ` sequential repetitions;
this suces for applying our main theorem to rule out using Turing reductions for basing the
security of such blind signature schemes on standard assumptions.
On the soundness of the Random Oracle and Generic Group models As mentioned, in
the Random Oracle model, commitments secure against adaptive-selective decommitments are easy
to construct (see [DNRS03]); thus, by our results, this yields (yet another, see [CGH04]) example
of a Random Oracle based scheme that cannot be provably instantiated using a concrete function,
if we restrict to Turing reductions.5
We also mention that Shoup [Sho97] has proven that Schnorr's identication scheme is secure
in the generic group model; thus, our results yield a natural example where security proofs in the
generic group model cannot be extended to security reductions based on any standard assumption.
(As far as we know, such separations had previously only been established for \articial" protocols.)
4Dwork, Naor, Reingold and Stockmeyer [DNRS03] show that the GMW protocol instantiated with \plain" (i.e.,
non-adaptive) selective-decommitment secure commitment satises some weak notions of zero-knowledge which, in
particular, imply single-instance witness-hiding for unique witness relations.
5We mention that the result of [CGH04] is stronger in the sense that any instantiation of their scheme with a
concrete function can actually be broken. In contrast, we just show that the instantiated scheme cannot be proven
secure using a Turing reduction.
41.2 Other Related Work
Fully black-box separations The seminal work of Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR88] provides a
framework for proving black-box separations between cryptographic primitives. We highlight that
this framework considers so-called \fully-black-box constructions" (see [RTV04] for a taxonomy of
various black-box separations); that is, the framework considers black-box constructions (i.e., the
higher-level primitive only uses the underlying primitive as a black-box), and black-box reductions.
(In contrast, we consider also non-black-box constructions.) In this regime, Bellare, Hofheinz and
Yilek [BHY09] present limitations of (weak notions of) fully-black-box commitment schemes secure
against selective decommitment, and Haitner, Rosen and Shaltiel [HRS09] show that certain strong
types of fully-black-box constructions of constant-round public-coin proofs of knowledge cannot be
witness hiding.6
Lower-bounds for general black-box reductions Turning to lower-bounds also for non-black
box constructions, the seminal work of Goldreich and Krawczyk [GK96] shows that no constant-
round public-coin protocols with negligible soundness error can be black-box zero-knowledge; (black-
box) zero-knowledge is a signicantly stronger property than sequential witness hiding, but as we
shall see some of the techniques from this work will be useful for our lower bounds.
Following the works of Brassard [Bra83] and Akavia et al [AGGM06], demonstrating limitations
of \NP-hard Cryptography", in [Pas06], we relate the question of demonstrating witness hiding of
constant-round public-coin proofs for NP using black-box reductions and the question of whether
one-way functions can be based on NP-hardness (again using black-box reductions); as shown in
[PTV10], this result can be interpreted as a conditional lower bound (under a new assumption) on
the possibility of using black-box reductions to demonstrate a notion of witness hiding for constant-
round public-coin proofs for NP based on one-way functions. As far as we know, these are the
only lower-bounds that consider non-black-box constructions and general (i.e., unrestricted) Turing
reductions.
Lower-bounds for restricted black-box reductions To obtain stronger lower-bounds for non-
black-box constructions, following the works of Feigenbaum and Fortnow [FF93] and Bogdanov and
Trevisan [BT08] on the power of random self-reducible and non-adaptive reductions, several recent
works prove limitations of restricted types of reductions for the above-mentioned problems. In
this regime, Bresson, Monnerat and Vergnaud [BMV08] present limitations for basing the one-
more discrete logarithm assumption on certains specic assumptions and using some restricted
types of Turing reductions; Haitner, Rosen and Shaltiel [HRS09] rule out certain restricted types
of reductions for demonstrating witness hiding of constant-round public-coin proof of knowledge
protocols; Fischlin and Schroeder [FS10] provide lower-bounds for certain types of non-interactive
blind signature schemes based on \non-interactive hardness assumptions" using certain restricted
reductions. As we shall shortly explain, in the above three works, the reasons for considering
restricted reductions (and restricted assumptions) are the same; the main technical contribution of
this work is circumventing these problems.
6More precisely, they rule out the existence of so-called \transcript-knowledge extractable" public-coin protocols;
roughly speaking, these are protocol where a witness to the statement proved can be \straight-line" extracted by
observing all the oracle calls to the underlying primitive. The GMW protocol satises this property if viewing
the commitments in the GMW protocol as the underlying primitive. But it is unknown if the GMW protocol
(when instantiated with one-way function based commitments of [Nao91, HILL99]) satises \transcript knowledge-
extractability" it viewing the one-way function as the underlying primitive.
51.3 Proof Techniques
To prove our main theorem, assume there exists a Turing reduction R such that RA breaks the
assumption C whenever A breaks sequential witness hiding of a computationally special-sound
argument (P;V ) for a language with unique witnesses. We want to use R to directly break C
without the help of A. So, just as in [BMV08, HRS09, FS10], the goal will be to eciently emulate
A for R. We will consider a particular oracle A that after hearing an appropriate number of
proofs using (P;V ) (acting as a verier) simply outputs a witness to the statement proved. As in
the above-mentioned earlier works, the idea is to \extract" out the witness that A is supposed to
provide R by \rewinding" R|after all, since (P;V ) is computationally special-sound, R, intuitively,
must know a witness for all statements x that it gives proofs of to A. The problem with formalizing
this intuition is that the reduction R is not a \stand-alone" prover|it might rewind and reset the
oracle A, so it is no longer clear that it needs to \know" a witness for x in order to convince A
of x. To get around this problem, [BMV08, HRS09, FS10] considered restricted reductions which
ensure that R only queries A in a \nice" way, facilitating the extraction.7 When considering general
reductions, we run into the following three problems.
1. If R \nests" its oracle calls, then a naive extraction might results in an exponential running-
time; the problem is analogous to that of performing simulation in the context of Concurrent
Zero-knowledge [DNS04].
2. When considering general assumptions C, we need to be careful not to \disturb" the outside
interaction with C.
3. Finally, we need to ensure that even if we manage to appropriately rewind R, the witness we
extract out actually is a valid witness.
To deal with the rst two problems, we leverage the fact that we consider witness hiding under
sequential composition (as opposed to single-instance witness hiding as in [HRS09]). This means
that we only need to provide R with a witness for a statement x after it has provided suciently
many proofs of x; now, we can use ideas from positive results on concurrent zero-knowledge, and,
in particular, simulation techniques inspired by those of Richardson and Kilian [RK99] (and their
renements in [PV08, DGS09, CLP10]) to ensure that we can rewind R without \blowing-up" the
run-time, and while ensuring that we do not disturb the outside execution with C. We mention
that we cannot use these techniques in a \black-box" fashion. For instance, we do not know how
to adapt the simulation technique of Kilian-Petrank [KP01] to work in our setting. There are two
reasons for this: 1) The reduction R might be rewinding its oracle, so we actually need a \resettable
zero-knowledge" simulation [CGGM00]. 2) In contrast to the setting of concurrent and resettable
zero-knowledge, we cannot design the protocol to be analyzed|rather the only thing we know
is that the protocol consists of suciently many repetitions of a computationally special-sound
protocol. Handling these issues requires a somewhat dierent analysis.
To deal with the third problem, we leverage the fact that we consider computationally special-
sound protocols (as opposed to general proofs of knowledge, as in [HRS09]). We show (relying
on ideas from [GK96, Pas06]) that such protocols intuitively satisfy a notion of \resettably-sound"
[BGGL01] proofs of knowledge (when appropriately generating the verier messages)|that is, they
remain proofs of knowledge even under resetting attacks.
7For instance, [HRS09] consider so-called \shielding" reductions R, which roughly speaking, never \intertwine"
proofs of dierent statements. This can be viewed as a generalization the \parameter-invariant" reductions of
[BMV08].
6On the role of unique witnesses. Let us point out exactly where in the proof the unique
witness requirement is used. Recall that we are rewinding R to extract out a witness so that we
can emulate the oracle A for R. If the statement x has a unique witness w, we can ensure that the
extracted witness will be identical to the witness that the oracle A would have returned. When
dealing with statements with multiple witnesses, this might no longer be the case|in particular,
although the rewinding procedure will succeed in extracting some witnesses, the distribution of
the extracted witnesses might be dierent than the distribution of witnesses actually provided by
A; thus, we can no longer guarantee that R succeeds in breaking the assumption C. This is not
just an artifact of the proof: As mentioned, for languages with multiple witnesses, constant-round,
sequentially witness-hiding special-sound proofs are known [FS90].8
1.4 On Non-black-box Reductions
In this work we consider only Turing (i.e., black-box) reductions. As demonstrated by Barak's
beautiful work [Bar01], non-black-box reductions can be used to analyze some zero-knowledge
arguments. In fact, a variant of the protocol of Barak due to [PR05] is constant-round, public-
coin, computationally special-sound and zero-knowledge (thus also witness hiding under sequential
composition).
We would like to argue that in the context of security reductions, Turing reductions provide
a semantically stronger (and more meaningful) notion of security than non-black box reductions,
and are thus interesting to study in their own right. The existence of a Turing reduction from
some problem P to the task of breaking a crypto system implies that any \physical device" with
a reproducible behavior that breaks our crypto system, can be used|with only a polynomial slow-
down|to solve P. With a non-black box reduction, we can only solve P if we have an explicit
description of the code of the attack on the crypto system. Such descriptions might be hard to nd
in practice: Consider, for instance, a \human-aided" computation, where a human is interacting
with a computer program in order to break the crypto system;9 getting an explicit description of
the attack requires providing an explicit (and \short") description of our brain.
If the reader does not nd the above \philosophical" argument compelling, we note that, to
date, non-black reductions have only been successfully used to analyze interactive protocols that
are impractical (e.g., they rely on PCPs). Furthermore, such techniques have only be successful
in analyzing computationally-sound protocols (i.e., arguments); in contrast, many of the protocols
we are considering are proof systems (i.e., they are unconditionally sound). So, one conservative
way to interpret our results is that \current techniques" cannot be used to prove security of, for
instance, Schnorr's identication scheme.
1.5 Overview
We provide some preliminaries and standard denitions in Section 2; we provide some new deni-
tions in Section 3, and present our main theorem in Section 4. In Section 5 we provide the proof of
the the main theorem. Section 7 contains our results about the selective decommitment problem,
in Section 8 we present lower-bounds for generalized versions of one-more inversion assumptions,
and in Section 9 we present lower bounds for unique blind signatures.
8We remark that the unique witness requirement can be slightly relaxed. For instance, it suces to ensure that
the special-soundness extractor always recovers a uniformly chosen witness if there are many witnesses. This suces
for emulating an oracle that picks a uniform witness. We have not pursued this avenue further.
9Practical attacks on crypto-systems often are not fully automatized, but do indeed rely on such interactions; see
e.g., [AAG
+00].
72 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Integer, Strings and Vectors. We denote by N the set of natural numbers: 0, 1, 2, :::. Unless
otherwise specied, a natural number is presented in its binary expansion (with no leading 0s)
whenever given as an input to an algorithm. If n 2 N, we denote by 1n the unary expansion of n
(i.e., the concatenation of n 1's). Given a string x, we let xji denote the i'th bit of x. We denote
by ~ x a nite sequence of elements x1;x2;:::xn, and we let j~ xj denote the number of elements in
the sequence.
Algorithms. We employ the following notation for algorithms.
Probabilistic algorithms. By a probabilistic algorithms we mean a Turing machine that receives
an auxiliary random tape as input. If M is a probabilistic algorithm, then for any input x,
the notation \Mr(x)" denotes the output of the M on input x when receiving r as random
tape. We let the notation \M(x)" denote the probability distribution over the outputs of M
on input x where each bit of the random tape r is selected at random and independently, and
then outputting Mr(x).
Interactive Algorithms. We assume familiarity with the basic notions of an Interactive Turing
Machine [GMR89] (ITM for brevity) and a protocol. (Briey, a protocol is pair of ITMs
computing in turns. In each turn, called a round, only one ITM is active. A round ends with
the active machine either halting|in which case the protocol halts|or by sending a message
m to the other machine, which becomes active with m as a special input. By an interactive
algorithm we mean a (probabilistic) interactive Turing Machine.
Given a pair of interactive algorithms (A;B), we let hA(a);B(b)i(x) denote the probability
distribution over the outputs of B(b) after interacting with A(a) on the common input x.
Oracle algorithms. An oracle algorithm is an machine that gets oracle access to another machine.
Given a probabilistic oracle algorithm M and a probabilistic algorithm A, we let MA(x)
denote the probability distribution over the outputs of the oracle algorithm M on input x,
when given oracle access to A.
We will also consider oracle algorithms that get access to deterministic interactive algorithms.
Given a probabilistic oracle algorithm M, and a deterministic interactive algorithm A, we
let MA(x) denote the probability distribution over the outputs of the algorithm M on input
x, when given oracle access to the \next-messages" function of A (i.e., the function that on
input the messages (m1;::;ml) outputs the next messages sent by A on common input x
and receiving the messages (m1;::;ml); note that this is well dened since we only consider
deterministic oracles.)
Negligible functions. The term \negligible" is used for denoting functions that are asymp-
totically smaller than the inverse of any xed polynomial. More precisely, a function () from
non-negative integers to reals is called negligible if for every constant c > 0 and all suciently large
n, it holds that (n) < n c.
2.2 Basic Denitions
In this section we provide some standard denitions and preliminaries.
82.3 Black-box reductions
We consider probabilistic polynomial time Turing reductions|i.e., black-box reductions. A black-
box reduction thus refers to a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle algorithm. Roughly speaking, a
black-box reduction from a task A to a task B, is a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine
R such that RO \breaks" B, whenever the oracle O \breaks" A. As mentioned, when considering
interactive oracles, we restrict attention to deterministic oracles; in particular, this means that the
reduction has the power to restart or \rewind" its oracle; black-box reductions in the context of
interactive protocols often take advantage of this feature.
2.4 Indistinguishability
The following denition of (computational) indistinguishability originates in the seminal paper of
Goldwasser and Micali [GM84].
Let X be a countable set of strings. A probability ensemble indexed by X is a sequence of random
variables indexed by X. Namely, any element of A = fAxgx2X is a random variable indexed by X.
Denition 1 (Indistinguishability). Let X be a countable set. Two ensembles fAn;xgn2N;x2X and
fBn;xgn2N;x2X are said to be computationally indistinguishable, if for every probabilistic machine
D (the \distinguisher") whose running time is polynomial in its rst input, there exists a negligible
function () so that for every n 2 N;x 2 X:
jPr[D(n;x;An;x) = 1]   Pr[D(n;x;Bn;x) = 1]j < (jxj)
In the above expression, D is simply given a sample from Ax;y and Bx;y, respectively. fAn;xgn2N;x2X
and fBn;xgn2N;x2X are said to be statistically indistinguishable over X if the above condition holds
for all (possibly unbounded) machines D.
2.5 Witness Relations
We recall the denition of a witness relation for an NP language [Gol01].
Denition 2 (Witness relation). A witness relation for a language L 2 NP is a binary relation
RL that is polynomially bounded, polynomial time recognizable and characterizes L by L = fx :
9ws:t:(x;w) 2 RLg.
We say that w is a witness for the membership x 2 L if (x;w) 2 RL. We will also let RL(x)
denote the set of witnesses for the membership x 2 L, i.e., RL(x) = fw : (x;w) 2 Lg. If for each
x 2 L, there exists a single w 2 RL(x), we say that RL is a unique witness relation.
We will be interested in probability ensembles over witness relations.
Denition 3 (Probability ensembles over witness relations). Let RL be a witness relation. We
call D = fDngn2N an ensemble of distributions over RL if Dn is a probability distribution over
RL \ (f0;1gp(n)  f0;1g) where p is a polynomial.
We call D = fDngn2N an ensemble of distributions over RL with auxiliary information if Dn
is a probability distribution over RL \ (f0;1gp(n)  f0;1g)  f0;1g where p is a polynomial.
92.6 Interactive Proofs and Arguments
We recall the standard denitions of interactive proofs and arguments.10
Denition 4 (Interactive Proofs and Arguments [GMR89, BCC88]). A pair of probabilistic inter-
active algorithms (P;V ) is called an interactive proof system for a language L with witness relation
RL if V is polynomial-time and the following two conditions hold.
 Completeness: For every x 2 L, and every y 2 RL(x),
Pr
h
hP(y);V i(x) = 1
i
= 1
 Soundness: For every x = 2 L, every z 2 f0;1g and every interactive algorithm P
Pr
h
(hP(z);V i(x) = 0
i

1
2
In case that the soundness condition holds only with respect to a provers P whose running-time
is polynomially bounded in the common input, the pair (P;V ) is called an interactive argument
system.
2.7 Witness Hiding
Let us recall the denition of Witness Hiding under sequential composition [FS90]. Given an ensem-
ble D = fDngn2N of distributions over RL with auxiliary information, let WIN(P;V )(D;RL;A;p;n)
denote the output of the following experiment: Sample (x;y;z) from Dn, and let A(x;z) commu-
nicate with P(x;y) in p(n) sequential executions; output 1 if A nally outputs a witness w s.t.
w 2 RL(x).
Denition 5 (Witness Hiding). Let (P;V ) be a interactive proof (argument) for L with witness
relation RL, D be an ensemble of distributions over RL with auxiliary input and p() be a polynomial.
We say that (P;V ) is witness-hiding w.r.t. D;RL under p() sequential repetitions if for every
adversary A whose running-time is polynomially-bounded in its rst input, there exists a negligible
function  such that for all n 2 N,
Pr
h
WIN(P;V )(D;RL;A;p;n) = 1
i
 (n)
We say that (P;V ) is single-instance witness hiding (or simply witness-hiding) w.r.t D;RL if (P;V )
is witness-hiding w.r.t D;RL under 1 sequential repetition. We say that (P;V ) is witness-hiding
w.r.t D;RL under sequential composition if (P;V ) is witness-hiding w.r.t D;RL under p() sequen-
tial repetitions for all polynomials p.
10We only consider interactive proofs and arguments with perfect completeness. We believe that, at the cost of
complicating the proof, our results can be extended also to protocols where completeness only holds with overwhelming
probability; we have not pursued this path.
103 New Denitions
3.1 Computational Special-soundness
Recall that a three-round public-coin11 interactive proof is said to be special-sound [CDS94], if
a valid witness to the statement x can be eciently computed from any two accepting proof-
transcripts of x which have the same rst message but dierent second messages. For instance,
Goldwasser, Micali and Racko's Quadratic Residuosity protocol [GMR89], and Blum's Hamilto-
nian Cycle (Blum-HC) protocol [Blu86] are both all special-sound. One standard relaxation of
special-soundness only requires that a witness for x can be extracted from m(jxj) accepting proof
transcripts with the same rst message but dierent second messages, where m() is a polyno-
mial. Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson's Graph 3-Coloring (GMW-G3C) [GMW91] protocol is an
example of such a proof system.
Two other relaxations are possible. We may consider protocols with more than three rounds.
Furthermore, we may consider protocols that only satisfy a computational notion of special-
soundness; that is, we only require that extraction is successful if the transcripts are generated
in an interaction with a computationally-bounded prover.
Roughly speaking, we say that a k-round protocol is m()-computationally special sound, if
the k   1'th round is a verier round and with overwhelming probability a witness to x can be
extracted from any m(jxj) accepting proof transcript that have been obtained by communicating
with a computationally bounded prover, where the rst k   2'th messages are all the same, but
the k   1'st messages are all dierent. We note that, for instance, GMW-G3C and Blum-HC,
instantiated with statistically-hiding commitments, satisfy this notion of special-soundness. We
refer to the k   1'th message as the verier challenge.
Denition 6 (Computational Special-soundness). Let (P;V ) be a k-round (where k is a constant)
public-coin interactive argument for the language L 2 NP with witness relation RL. (P;V ) is
said to be computationally special-sound if there exists a polynomial m(), and a polynomial-time
extractor machine X, such that for every polynomial-time machine P, and every polynomial p(),
there exists a negligible function  such that the following holds for every x 2 L and every auxiliary
input z for P. Let ~ T = (T1;T2;:::Tp(jxj) denote transcripts in p(jxj) random executions between
P(x;z) and V (x) where V uses the same randomness for the rst k   2 rounds (thus, the rst
k   2 rounds are the same in all transcripts). Then, the probability (over the randomness used to
generate ~ T) that:
1. ~ T contains a set of m(jxj) accepting transcripts with dierent round k   1 messages; and
2. X(~ T0) does not output a witness w 2 RL(x), where ~ T0 consist of the rst m(jxj) accepting
transcripts with dierent round k   1 messages,
is smaller than (jxj).
We say that a computationally special-sound protocol has a large challenge space if the length
of the verier challenge is !(logn) on common inputs of length n.
Note that if a protocol is computationally special-sound with a large challenge space, there
is a canonical \extraction" procedure from a prover P: Honestly emulate the role of V for P;
if the proof is accepting, rewind P sending it new uniformly chosen verier challenges until we
get m(jxj) accepting proof transcripts; nally apply the special-soundness extractor X on these
11Recall that in a public-coin protocol, the verier's messages are just independent portions of its random tape.
11transcripts|except with negligible probability, all of the accepting proofs have dierent verier
challenges and extraction thus succeeds.
Remark 1. A slightly more general notion of computational special-soundness: We note that for
our proof it suces to consider a standard generalization of public-coin protocols. It suces that
the verier's next message function is a function of the current partial transcript and some fresh
random coins: that is, in round i the verier picks a random string ri, and computes its next
message as a function of the public transcript and ri (but not as a function of any of the earlier
coin tosses rj, j < i). The knowledge extractor, on the other hand, gets access to not only the
public transcript, but also all the random strings r1;r3;:::rk 1; that is, the knowledge extractor
X now takes as input a sequence of verier views ~ V0. We refer to such protocols as generalized
computationally special-sound. For such a generalized notion of computational special-soundness,
the notion of \large challenge space" requires that the length of the randomness rk 1 used in the
verier challenge is !(logn).
Remark 2. Why we don't work with any proof of knowledge: In our proof we require the existence
of an extractor that works even if the malicious prover gets to rewind, or \reset", the extractor.
This feature is not a priori guaranteed by the traditional notion of a proof of knowledge; indeed, it
is easy to come up with good extractors that fail under a reset attack: Consider, for instance, the
following public-coin protocol where a) the Prover rst commits to a string s, b) the Verier sends
a string s0, and c) the Prover nally a provides proof of knowledge that x is true or that s0 = s.
A naive extractor simply sends a random string s, and then extracts a witness from the proof of
knowledge protocol in steps c). It is easy to see that this extractor fails under a reset attack: The
malicious prover simply nds out what s0 is and next commits to s = s0 in step a) and uses this as
a fake witness in step c). (Of course, for this particular attack, this problem can be circumvented
by considering a specic extractor that generates the message s0 by applying an appropriate hash
function to the commitment, but it is unclear how this can be done in general.)
3.2 Standard Assumptions
Following Naor [Nao03], we model an assumption as an interaction (or game) between a probabilistic
machine C|called the challenger|and an attacker A. Both parties get as input 1n where n is
the security parameter. The only requirement is that this interaction has an a priori bounded
polynomial number of rounds; that is, there exists some polynomial r() such that C on input 1n
communicates with A in at most r(n) rounds and nally outputs either 1 or 0. Any such challenger
C intuitively corresponds the assumption:
For every polynomial-time adversary A, there exists a negligible function  such that
for all n 2 N, the probability that C outputs 1 after interacting with A is bounded by
(n).
We say that A breaks C with probability p on common input 1n if Pr[hA;Ci(1n) = 1]  p.
Note that we can easily model all traditional cryptographic assumptions (e.g., that f is a one-
way function, or that factoring is hard for polynomial-time) as a challenger C. Also note that
the assumption that a protocol (P;V ) is witness hiding for a particular instance distribution can
be modeled as a standard assumption: Simply let C be the machine that samples an instance x
according to the distribution and next runs the prover algorithm and nally accepts if A outputs a
witness for x. In fact, in the same way we can model the assumption that (P;V ) is witness hiding
under a priori bounded sequential composition. This explains why for our results we need to restrict
12to C having a bounded number of rounds; otherwise, we could simply consider the assumption that
(P;V ) is witness hiding under unbounded sequential composition.
We remark that our modeling of a standard assumption is similar to Dodis, Oliviera and
Pietrazk's [DOP05] notion of a hard game. It diers in the following aspects: First, as [DOP05]
consider only fully-black-box constructions, their notion of hard games are dened relative to some
oracles. Secondly, (just as in [Nao03]), they restrict to polynomial-time challengers. Although this
suces for modeling most natural assumptions, we also want to be able to capture assumptions
of the kind \it is hard to invert f on two random points, even if we get one arbitrary inversion
query"; to model this as a game requires having C perform the inversion, which in general may
require super-polynomial time.
4 The Main Theorem
We want to formalize the statement that there cannot exists a reduction from breaking any standard
assumption C to \blatantly" breaking witness hiding of a computationally special-sound protocol|
namely, always recovering the witness to the statement x after seeing polynomially many sequential
proofs of x, no matter what distribution the instances come from. Let us start by formalizing what
it means to break witness hiding in this strong way.
Denition 7 (Strongly Breaking Witness Hiding). Let (P;V ) be an argument for the language L
with witness relation RL. We say that A strongly breaks `()-sequential witness hiding of (P;V )
with respect to RL if for every n 2 N, every x 2 L \ f0;1gn;w 2 RL(x), A wins in the following
experiment with probability 1: Let A(x) sequentially communicate with P(x;w), p(n) times; A is
said to win if it outputs a witness w0 such that w0 2 RL(x).
We say that a protocol (P;V ) is weakly `()-sequentially witness hiding w.r.t RL if no polynomial-
time algorithm A strongly breaks `()-sequential witness hiding of (P;V ) w.r.t RL. Let us now turn
to dening what it means to base weak witness hiding on the hardness of a standard assumption
C.
Denition 8 (Basing Weak Witness Hiding on C). We say that R is a black-box reduction for basing
weak `()-sequential witness hiding of (P;V ) w.r.t RL on the hardness of C if R is a probabilistic
polynomial-time oracle machine, such that for every deterministic machine A that strongly breaks
`()-sequential witness hiding of (P;V ) with respect to RL, there exists a polynomial p() such that
for innitely many n 2 N, RA breaks C with probability 1
p(n) on input 1n.
We are now ready to state our main theorem.
Theorem 2. Let (P;V ) be a (generalized) computationally-special-sound argument with large chal-
lenge space for the language L with a unique witness relation RL, and let C be a standard assump-
tion. If for every polynomial `() there exists a black-box reduction R for basing weak `()-sequential
witness hiding of (P;V ) w.r.t RL on the hardness of C, then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-
time machine B and a polynomial p0() such that for innitely many n 2 N, B breaks C with
probability 1
p0(n) on input 1n.
That is, if RL is a unique witness relation, and (P;V ) is computationally special-sound with
large challenge space, then if we can base weak sequential witness hiding of (P;V ) w.r.t RL on the
hardness of C, then C can already be broken in polynomial time.
13Remark 3. (A quantitative version) As becomes evident in the proof, we, in fact, prove the follow-
ing quantitative version of Theorem 2: there does not exist a reduction from breaking any r()-round
assumption C that cannot already be broken in polynomial-time, to strongly breaking `()-sequential-
witness hiding, where `(n) = !(n + 2r(n) + 1).12
Remark 4. (On the length of the verier challenge) Note that the restriction on the length of
the verier challenge in (P;V ) is necessary: There exist zero-knowledge protocols that are (com-
putationally) special-sound with verier challenges of length O(logn) based on one-way functions:
simply consider a parallelized version of the protocol of Blum [Blu86].13
Remark 5. (On super-polynomial-time reductions) As becomes evident in the proof, the theorem
extends also to super-polynomial-time reductions R with running-time T as long as the computa-
tional special-soundness of (P;V ) holds with respect to T0 = TO(logn T)) time adversaries, and as
long as the length of the verier challenge is !(logT0). Both restrictions are necessary for this
result:
 As noted in [CGGM00, Pas04], if we repeat Blum-HC log2 n times in parallel, we get a special-
sound proof that is zero-knowledge with a quasi-polynomial-time simulator; this, in particular,
means that the protocol is sequentially witness hiding (even for unique witness relations) for
all distributions that are \hard for quasi-polynomial time", and this can be proven using a
super-polynomial time black-box reduction. But this protocol has a \short" verier challenge.
 Additionally, [Pas04] shows (assuming the existence of one-way permutations), the existence
of a four-round computationally special-sound argument that is zero-knowledge with a quasi-
polynomial-time simulator and has an n-bit long verier challenge; the protocol, however, is
only sound for polynomial-time algorithms.
5 Proof of the Main Theorem
Let (P;V ) be a k-round (generalized) computationally-special-sound argument with large challenge
space for the language L with a unique witness relation RL, and let C be an r()-round standard
assumption. For ease of presentation, we start by considering the case when C is polynomial-time
computable (most common assumptions used in cryptography actually fall into this case); at the
end of the proof, we explain how to modify the proof to work also when C is not ecient.
Let `(n) = !(n + r(n) + 1). Assume that there exists a black-box reduction R for basing weak
`()-sequential witness hiding of (P;V ) w.r.t RL on the hardness of C. That is, for every A that
strongly breaks `()-sequential witness hiding of (P;V ) w.r.t RL, there exists a polynomial p() such
that for innitely many n 2 N, RA breaks C on common input 1n with probability 1
p(n). We show
the existence of a probabilistic polynomial-time machine that directly breaks C without the help
of A; that is, there exists a polynomial p0() such that for innitely many n 2 N, B breaks C on
common input 1n with probability 1
p0(n).
The machine B will use the reduction R as a black-box, and emulate a particular oracle A for
R. At rst sight this seems impossible: the reduction R is only useful if we run it on an oracle A
12In fact, it is easy to see that the our proof can be adapted to even handle the case when `(n) = !(n
 + 2r(n))),
where  > 0.
13This protocol only has inverse polynomial (as opposed to negligible) soundness error. If this bothers the reader,
simply consider using Blum-HC for proving knowledge of a witness for the \trivial" language L = f0;1g
. For instance,
let f be a one-way permutation, let y 2 RL(x) if and only if f(y) = x, and let L be the language characterized by
RL. Blum-HC repeated in parallel logn times can be used to prove L w.r.t. RL with 0 soundness error.
14that strongly breaks witness hiding of (P;V ), but doing this (a priori) requires super-polynomial
time. We here use the fact that (P;V ) is computationally special-sound. Recall that A only needs
to return a witness to R after R has provided it with (polynomially-many sequentially-ordered)
accepting proofs of the same statement x. Now, intuitively, for R to succeed in this task, R must
already \know" a witness w 2 RL(x); the idea is to \extract" out this witness from R (this is similar
to [HRS09]) by \rewinding" it. The problem is that R might already be rewinding its oracle A, so
it is no longer clear how to perform such an extraction. More specically, we need to deal with the
following three issues:14
 R might \intertwine" its proof queries to A for many dierent statements x; in particular, it
might \nest" these proofs. This has the eect that the naive way of extracting the witnesses
from R leads to an exponential blow-up in running-time (c.f. [DNS04]). We here use the
fact that R needs to provide A with polynomially many sequential proofs of the statement
x, before A needs to return a witness for x; this makes it possible for B to nd one of these
sequentially many proof from which extraction can be done, without increasing the running-
time by too much. We here rely on techniques from [RK99, PV08, DGS09, CLP10] originally
designed for the analysis of concurrent zero-knowledge protocols [DNS04].
 When performing extraction we need to be careful not to aect the external interaction with
C. More precisely, when rewinding R, R might send a new message in the external interaction
with C, and might only send a query to its oracle after it gets back an answer from C. Again,
since R needs to provide polynomially many proofs of x to A before A will return a witness for
x, we can ensure that there exists at least one proof that can be rewound (without increasing
the run-time too much) and at the same time without resending any messages in the external
interaction with C.
 Using the above approach, we show how B can obtain any polynomial number of accepting
proof transcripts of x where the rst k 2 messages are the same, but (with high probability)
the k   1'st messages are all dierent, before it has to provide R with a witness for x. Thus,
intuitively, by computational special-soundness of (P;V ), B can run the special-soundness
extractor on these accepting transcript and get a valid witness. The problem is that compu-
tational special-soundness only requires extraction to work when the rst k 2 messages have
been generated in an interaction with a \standard" (non-rewinding) polynomial-time prover,
but in our context they have been generated in a conversation with R (acting as a prover),
and R has the possibility of rewinding its oracle. We rely on the fact that (P;V ) is public-coin
(or that the verier's next message function only depends on the public transcription) and
only has a constant number of rounds (and techniques similar to Goldreich-Krawzyk [GK96]
and their use in [Pas06]) to show that despite the fact that R is rewinding its oracle, it can
still not generate a transcript for which special-soundness extraction fails.
We proceed to a description of the machine B that breaks C with inverse polynomial probability
for innitely many n 2 N. For simplicity, we provide the description of a machine B that runs in
expected polynomial time|by the Markov inequality, we can truncate the execution of this machine
while still maintaining an inverse polynomial success probability for innitely many n. To simplify
notation we consider the case when (P;V ) is public-coin and (P;V ) thus satises the standard (as
14The reason that [HRS09] do not have to deal with these problems is that they either consider restricted black-box
protocols where extraction can be performed \straight-line" (i.e., without rewinding R), or restricted reductions for
which these issues do not arise).
15opposed to generalized) notion of computational special-soundness. At the end of the proof we
explain how the proof extends to the generalized notion. Let us start by xing some notation:
 Let m = m(n) denote the number of accepting transcript required by the computation special-
soundness property of (P;V ) on inputs of length n;
 Let r = r(n) denote the number of communication rounds by C on input 1n;
 Let M = M(n) denote the maximum number of queries to its oracle by R on input 1n;
 Let ` = `(n) = !(n + r + 1) denote the number of sequential repetitions used for strongly
breaking witness hiding of (P;V ).
Towards the construction of B, we also make two (standard) simplifying assumptions about R:
 R never asks the same query twice to its oracle;
 Whenever R sends a query q to its oracle, it has previously queried the oracle on all partial
transcripts in q.
Both of these assumptions are without loss of generality; we can always modify R, at the cost of
only a polynomial blow-up in running-time, to satisfy these two conditions.
Let f be a function, and let Af be a machine dened as follows. Af, on input 1n, acts as
the honest verier V in ` sequential interactions with a prover for (P;V ), but with the exception
that instead of generating truly random messages (as V would have done), Af computes its next
message by applying f to the current partial transcript (and appropriately truncating the output
of f to be of the right length); nally, after the `(n) interactions, if all proofs are accepting, Af
uses brute-force to extract a witness (if one exists) and outputs it (and ? if no witness exists). We
next consider a random oracle: Let RO be a random variable uniformly distributed over functions
f0;1g ! f0;1g1. By denition we have that for each n, with probability 1 over the choice of RO,
ARO strongly breaks `()-sequential witness hiding of (P;V ) with respect to RL.15 Thus, by the
fact that R is a good reduction, we have that there exists some polynomial p() such that
Pr
h
hRARO
;Ci(1n) = 1
i

1
p(n)
: (1)
Remark 6. Before continuing, let us briey explain the reasons for using the random oracle RO.
There are two quite dierent reasons for this. First, it will allow us to \rewind" R while guaranteeing
that R does not "notice" that it is being rewound. (Assume instead that we had let A use the honest
verier strategy V . This strategy sends the same verier challenge no matter what (k   2)-round
message R sends it. Since R might rewind its oracle, it might thus send two dierent (k 2) round
messages for which it expects to hear back the same verier challenge from A. In such a situation it
becomes hard to "rewind" R feeding it new verier challenges.) Secondly (and similarly to [Pas06]),
this will ensure us that R cannot \cheat" in the proofs it provides to its oracle by rewind it.
Let us return to the construction of B. Roughly speaking, on input 1n, the goal of the machine
B will be to run R while eciently emulating the role of ARO. As previously mentioned, this will
be possible by appropriately rewinding R to extract witnesses w for statements x proved by R to
its oracle. More precisely, B will attempt to \rewind" the \verier-challenge" (i.e., the k   1'st
15We here rely on the fact that (P;V ) has perfect completeness, otherwise, we could only claim that A
RO breaks
sequential witness hiding with overwhelming probability for a random RO.
16message) in some of the proofs. We refer to the pair of a verier-challenge, and the prover answer
(i.e., the k   1'st, and the k'th messages) as a slot. We say that a slot \opens" when R receives a
verier challenge from its oracle, and that the same slot slot \closes", when R sends its oracle the
answer to the verier challenge. Note that by our simplifying assumptions on R, a slot can never
close without opening. However, also note that R might send a lot of other queries to its oracle
between the time when a slot opens and closes. So, when attempting to rewind a slot, we need to
be careful not to \redo" too much work. Formally, the opening of a slot is a partial view v of R
immediately after which the slot opens; we may now identify a slot s by the view corresponding to
its opening. Analogously, the closing of a slot s is a partial view v immediately after which s closes.
Let us turn to providing a high-level description of B. On a high-level, B internally incorporates
R, internally emulates ARO for R, but externally sends all communication between R and C (i.e.,
whenever R wants to send a message to C, B externally forwards it, and whenever B receives an
external message from C, it directly forwards it to R as if it came from its external interaction with
C). R emulates ARO for R by following exactly the same instruction as ARO until a slot s \closes"
and the following two properties hold:
 Between the time when the slot s opened, and the time that it closed, R did not send (and
thus not receive) any external messages (to or from C).
 Between the time when the slot s opened, and the time that it closed, the number of other
slots that opened is \small", where \small" will be dened shortly.
Whenever such a slot s closes, B rewinds R back until the point where s opened, and instead sends
R a new random verier challenge (by our simplifying assumption that R never asks its oracle the
same query twice, this can never create any inconsistencies), and continues the emulation of ARO
as before, but with the exception that if R opens too many new slots, the rewinding is cancelled.
B continues rewinding R until it gets m accepting closings of slot s; intuitively, this should allow
B to use the special-soundness extractor to recover a witness for the statement proved. We remark
that in contrast to the simulation technique of [RK99], we do not decide what slot to rewind based
on the number of executions that start within the slot, but rather, following [CLP10], decide what
slot to rewind, based on the number of slots within the slot.
More precisely, the emulation is dened recursively in the following manner. Given the view 
of R (w.l.o.g., this includes all the messages sent and received by R in the external interaction with
C, and all the messages sent and received between R and its oracle), we call a prex  of  d-good
if 1) R makes no external queries in  after , and 2) the number of slots that open in  after 
is at most M
nd (recall that M is a (polynomial) upper bound on the number of oracle queries made
by R). Given a partial view  after which we have the closing of a slot s, we say that the slot is
d-good in  if s is a d-good prex of .
Now, on recursive level d  0, starting from a view V, B emulates ARO for R, until a slot s
that opened inside the view V closes and the slot is d + 1-good for the current view v; whenever
this happens, it rewinds R back to the point when s opened, and invokes itself recursively at level
d+1. It continues rewinding until it gets m accepting closings of slot s, and then applies the special
soundness extractor X on these m transcripts; if the extractor outputs a valid witness w (to the
statement x currently proved by R), the pair (x;w) is stored. Furthermore, at each recursive level
d  1 (i.e., on all recursive levels except the rst one), if V is not a d-good prex of the current
view v (i.e., if the number of new openings of slots exceeds M
nd, or if R wants to send an external
message) the recursive procedure aborts (returning to the earlier recursive call); this ensures that
all rewindings are \cut-o" if R attempts to send external messages, or opens more slots, in the
17rewinding. Finally, whenever R is expecting to hear back a witness w for a statement x from ARO,
B checks whether such a witness w has been extracted; if so, it simply feeds it to R, and otherwise
B halts outputting fail.
We proceed to a formal description of the procedure B, and analyze its running-time and success
probability. B invokes the procedure EXT, described in Figure 1, on input (1n;0;1n).
Procedure EXT(1n;d;V):
On input the recursive level d and the partial view V of R, proceeds as follows. Let v = V.
Repeat the following:
 If d > 0 and v is the closing of the slot opened at V, return v.
 If d > 0 and the partial view v is not d-good, return ?.
 If d = 0 and R attempts to externally forward a message, externally forward it, and
feed R the answer received back; let v denote the updated view of R, and continue.
 If v is the closing of a slot s that opened after V and that is d + 1-good for v: let
i = 0; repeat the following until i = m(n):
{ Let v0 = EXT(1n;d + 1;s).
{ If v0 6= ?, let i = i + 1, vi = v0.
Finally, apply the special soundness extractor X on the transcripts of (P;V ) corre-
sponding to the m(n) views v1;:::;vm(n). If X succeeds in nding a witness w for
the statement x proved, store (x;w).
 If R is expecting to hear back a witness for the statement x, check if a pair (x;w) has
been stored. If so, feed w to R and update v accordingly and continue; otherwise
halt outputting fail.
 If R is expecting any other message of length l(n); simply feed R a random message
of length l(n), update v accordingly and continue.
Figure 1: Pseudo-code for the recursive simulation strategy by B.
Let us start by showing that the running time of B is bounded in expectation.
Proposition 1. There exists some polynomial t() such that B(1n) runs in expected time bounded
by t(n) for all n 2 N.
Proof. To simplify the analysis, let us consider a slight variant of B that never gets \stuck"|
instead of ever halting outputting fail, let us assume that B is magically feed a valid witness w if
it ever is required to provide a witness for a statement x for which has not recovered a witness.
Clearly this change can only increase B's running-time.
Note that the recursive level is bounded by c = logn M, which is a constant (since is M is
polynomial in n). Secondly, at each recursive level d, there are at most M possible points from
which we can rewind. As we shall argue, from each of these points (i.e., partial views), the expected
number of rewindings is bounded by m. Recall that in the execution of EXT(1n;d;V), B only starts
18\rewinding" a slot s if 1) the slot s opened in the view V, 2) the slot s closes in the current view v,
and 3) the slot s is d + 1-good for v. Furthermore, in each of the rewindings the simulated view of
the adversary on the recursive level d + 1 (i.e., in the execution of EXT(1n;d + 1;s)) is identically
distributed to its view in the execution on level d; note that we here rely on the unique witness
requirement and the assumption that B never gets \stuck". Thus, the probability that the slot s
becomes (d+1)-good for some view v0 in the recursive call on level d+1 (i.e., that the rewinding is
successful) is at least the probability that the slot was d+1-good on level d.16 Since B rewinds the
slot until it gets m accepting closings, the expected number of rewindings from each partial view
is thus m.
So, at each recursive level|i.e., in each invokation of EXT(1n;d;V)|the expected number
of rewindings|i.e., recursive invokations of EXT(1m;d + 1;V0) for some view V0|is bounded by
O(Mm). It follow using a standard induction that for each recursive level d  c, the total num-
ber of messages sent by EXT(1n;0;V) (and its recursive sub-routine calls) to R is bounded by
(O(Mm))c+1 d.
Let us now turn to analyze the success probability of B. We show that there exists a negligible
function () such that
Pr[hB;Ci(1n)]  Pr
h
hRARO
;Ci(1n)
i
  (n) (2)
Towards this, we consider a hybrid machine ~ B. ~ B is a variant of B that proceeds exactly as B,
but always recovers the witness requested by R using brute force; it thus never halts outputting
fail. Note that all recursive calls at level d > 0 are irrelevant for the external output of ~ B. And,
on level d = 0, ~ B perfectly emulates the role of ARO for R. Thus, ~ B's success probability in its
external interaction with C is identical to RARO
's success probability. That is, we have:
Pr
h
h ~ B;Ci(1n) = 1
i
= Pr
h
hRARO
;Ci(1n) = 1
i
(3)
Note that, by the unique witness requirement, unless B halts outputting fail, it proceeds iden-
tically to ~ B. We now show that B outputs fail with negligible probability, which by equation 3
concludes equation 2.
Proposition 2. There exists a negligible function  such that for all n 2 N, the probability that B
outputs fail in an interaction with C on common input 1n is bounded by (n).
Proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists some polynomial p() such that B outputs fail
with probability 1
p(n) for innitely many n. Since by Proposition 1, the expected running time of
B is polynomially bounded, it follows by the Markov inequality that there exists some polynomial
t() such that the probability that B outputs fail while taking less than t(n) steps is at least 1
2p(n).
Thus, from this point on, it suces to consider a truncated version B0 of B that runs in strict time
t(), and outputs fail with non-negligible probability. Let us consider the following two events:
 Let E1 denote the event that B0 is required to provide R with the witness for a statement x,
without having previously \rewound" at least one slots for a proofs of x.
 Let E2 denote the event that the special soundness extractor X fails to output a valid witness
in the execution by B0.
16The probability might actually be larger, since on level d we might also abort if the current view is no longer
d-good.
19Note that if neither of E1 of E2 happens, there always exists some slot that is rewound for which the
special-soundness extractor succeeds, which means that B0 must have stored an instance-witness
pair (x;w) before it is ever required to provide R with a witness for the statement x, and thus B0
can never fail.
We show below that the probability that either of these events happens is negligible.
Claim 1. There exists some negligible function (), such that the probability that E1 happens in
an execution between B0 and C on common input 1n is bounded by (n).
Proof. Note that by construction we have that for each instance x, B0 must have encountered
`(n) = !(n+r+1) slots for x before needing to return a witness for x. Since the recursive depth of
B0 is some constant c, there must thus exists some recursive level d with at least `=c slots for x; for
suciently big n, `=c  n+r+1. But since the total number of slots opening on level d is bounded
by M
nd (for d = 0, this follows by the denition of M; and for d > 0, this follows since by denition
of B the simulation at recursive level d is cancelled if more than M
nd slots open), there exists at least
r + 1 slots that contains less than M
nd+1 slots, and as a consequence at least 1 slot that contains
less than M
nd+1 slots and also does not contain any messages from the external interaction with C
(recall that C has r communication rounds); this slot is thus d + 1-good and will consequently be
rewound.
Claim 2. There exists some negligible function (), such that the probability that E2 happens in
an execution between B0 and C on common input 1n is bounded by (n).
Proof. Intuitively, the probability that event E2 happens should be negligible by the computa-
tional special-soundness property of (P;V ) (and the fact that the verier challenge is of length
!(logn) which means that except with negligible probability we won't see the same verier chal-
lenge twice). However, as R is rewinding its oracle, we are applying the special-soundness extractor
on transcripts that not necessarily are uniformly generated (as required by the denition of com-
putational special-soundness). Nonetheless, we show that with inverse polynomial probability we
are in fact applying the special-soundness extractor to transcripts that are uniformly generated,
thus reaching a contradiction. Roughly speaking, this follows from the fact that (P;V ) only has
a constant number of rounds and is public-coin, so (just as in the proof of [GK96, Pas06]) we can
with inverse polynomial probability \guess" on which of the \rewindings" special-soundness will be
broken, and thus turn the rewinding reduction R into a stand-alone prover P that breaks compu-
tational special-soundness. We use the assumption that C is eciently computable to ensure that
P is ecient as well.
We proceed to a formal proof. Assume for contradiction that there exists some polynomial g()
such that the special-soundness extraction fails with probability 1
g(n) for innitely many n (in the
execution of C and B0 on common input 1n). We construct a polynomial time machine P that
attempts to break the computational special-soundness property of (P;V ). For simplicity, we will
allow P to probabilistically pick the statement x to prove; using a standard averaging argument,
we can then x an appropriate part of P's random tape to ensure that the proof statement is
always the same, while maintaining the same success probability.
P will internally emulate an execution between C and B0 on input 1n, but will pick one random
(P;V ) proof provided by R and forward it externally|that is, it externally forwards the messages
that R tries to send to its oracle, and uses the external verier's answers as the answers to those
oracle queries). More precisely, P picks i1;i2;::;iq 2 [1;::;M], where q is the number of prover
20rounds in (P;V ). P then internally emulates an execution between C and B0 on input 1n with
the following dierences:
 If the i1'st query by R to its oracle is of \length 1"|that is, if it is of the form xjjm1 where
x is an instance and m1 is a rst round message of (P;V )|proceed as follows. Select the
statement x to prove externally, and forward externally the message m1. Upon receiving an
answer c1 from the external verier, let B0 use c1 as its answer to R.
 If furthermore the i2'nd query is of \length 2"|that is, if it consists of a second round query
(x0jjm0
1;m2) which additionally is consistent with the rst round query xjjm1 (i.e., x0 = x and
m1 = m0
1)|externally forward m2, and let B0 use the answer received back as its answer to
R.
 Continue in the same manner for all ij, j  q.
Now, consider applying the canonical extraction procedure to P; that is, emulate the honest
verier V for P, next rewind P feeding it new uniformly chosen verier challenges until we get
m(n) accepting transcripts, or until t(n) rewindings have been performed, and next apply the
special-soundness extractor on these transcripts.
Since B0 feeds R messages according to the same distribution as the canonical extraction pro-
cedure, the fact that the canonical extractor performs at least as many rewindings as B0 (recall
that B0's running-time is bounded by t(n)), the number of rounds in (P;V ) is constant, and R
makes at most M oracle calls, it follows that the special-soundness extractor fails with probability
at most 1
g(n)MO(1) when applying the canonical extraction procedure to P. This still doesn't di-
rectly contradict the computational special-soundness of (P;V )|it could be the case that we have
got two transcripts with the same verier challenge. But, since the canonical extraction procedure
picks the verier challenges at random, and the length of the verier challenge is !(logn), the
probability that any given pair of challenges collide is 2 !(logn). So, by the union bound (and the
fact that we perform at most a polynomial number of rewindings), the probability that any two
challenges collide is bounded by
poly(n)
2 !(log n), which is negligible. We thus have that computational
special-soundness of (P;V ) can be broken with probability 1
g(n)MO(1)  (n) where () is a negligible
function; this is a contradiction.
Remark 7. For clarity, let us highlight where in the proof of Claim 2 the public-coin and constant-
round properties of (P;V ) are used: The public-coin property is used only to ensure that we can
perfectly generate the verier's next message given only the public transcript of the interaction|this
is needed in order to emulate rewindings of the external execution. (This is why we can generalize
the argument also to generalized computationally special-sound protocols).
The constant-round restriction comes from the fact that the success probability of our reduction
degrades exponentially with the number of communication rounds of (P;V ).
Dealing with unbounded C The problem with unbounded machines C is that in the proof
of Claim 2, P can no longer eciently emulate the interaction between C and B0. To handle
this problem, we show that by slightly increasing `(n), we can ensure that the special-soundness
extractor needs to fail more than r + 1 times for B0 to fail; this means that for one of these
invokations of the special-soundness extractor, the transcripts of (P;V ) were generated without the
help of C. More precisely, let us consider the following two modied events:
21 Let E1 denote the event that B0 is required to provide R with the witness for a statement x,
without having previously \rewound" r(n) + 1 sequentially ordered slots for proofs of x.
 Let E2 denote the event that the special soundness extractor X fails to output a valid witness
in the execution by B0 for more than r(n) sequentially ordered slots for some statement x.
Note that if neither of E1 of E2 happens, then for every instance x, there always exists some slot
that is rewound for which the special-soundness extractor succeeds, and thus as before B0 can
never fail. We now just need to verify that Claim 1 and Claim 2 holds with respect to these new
denitions of the events E1;E2. Claim 1 follows identically as before if we let ` = !(n + 2r + 1)
(instead of !(n + r + 1).) To show Claim 2, we note that if the special soundness extractor fails
for r + 1 sequentially ordered slots with probability 1
g(n), there must exists some partial view 
for B0 such that conditioned on , with probability 1
g(n), the special-soundness extractor fails on
some execution of (P;V ) that is not yet xed in  and without there being any external messages
exchanged after  and the time when the extrator fails (recall that the interaction with C has at
most r rounds). We can now continue in exactly the same way as in the proof of Claim 2.
Dealing with generalized computationally special-sound protocols (P;V ). In case (P;V )
only satises the generalized notion of computational special-soundness from Remark 1, we need
to slightly adapt the oracle Af and the algorithm B in the following ways:
 Instead of simply using the function f to compute its next message, Af now uses the function
f to generate a string r of appropriate length, and next uses this string r as \randomness"
together with the public transcript to compute the verier's next message function (just as
V would have) in order to generate its next message.
 Instead of simply emulating the verier messages for R by sending it truly random strings, B
emulates them using the same approach as V |it picks a truly random string r and computes
the next message as a function of the public transcript and r.
 Instead of feeding the extractor X only the public transcripts, B now feeds X the m(n)
accepting views of V .
The rest of the proof remains unchanged: As noted in Remark 7, the fact that we can perfectly
generate the verier's next message function given a partial public transcript suces for proving
Claim 2, and the public-coin property is not used in other parts of the proof.
6 Security of Identication Schemes with Unique Secret-Keys
In this section we use our main theorem to rule out the possibility of basing the security of certain
types of identication schemes with \unique secret keys" (i.e., each public key is associated with
a single secret key) on standard assumptions using Turing reductions. As a corollary we establish
that the security of Schnorr's identication scheme cannot be based on any standard assumption
using a Turing reduction.
Let us start by recalling the denition of an identication scheme [FFS87]. Given an algorithm
K, interactive algorithms P;V;A, a polynomial p and n 2 N, let WIN(P;V )(K;A;p;n) denote the
output of the following experiment: Sample (pk;sk) as the output of K(1n), let A(pk) communicate
with P(sk;pk) in p(n) sequential executions, and next communicate with V (pk) once; output 1 if
V accepts.
22Denition 9 (Identication Scheme). An identication scheme is a triple (K;P;V ) where K
is probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, and P;V are probabilistic polynomial-time interactive
algorithms, and for every n 2 N, every (pk;sk) 2 K(1n),
Pr
h
hP(pk;sk);V i(pk) = 1
i
= 1
Denition 10 (Secure Identication Scheme). We say that an identication scheme (K;P;V ) is
secure if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A, there exists some negligible function
 such that for all polynomial p, and every n 2 N,
Pr
h
WIN(P;V )(K;A;p;n) = 1
i
 (n)
We will consider identication schemes (K;P;V ) of the following type:
 (P;V ) is a (generalized) computationally special-sound argument with large challenge space
for the language L with unique witness relation RL;
 (pk;sk) 2 RL if (pk;sk) 2 K(1n) for some n 2 N.
We refer to such identication schemes as unique identication schemes.
We can use our main theorem to show that Turing reductions cannot be used to prove the
security of any unique identication scheme based on standard assumptions.
Denition 11 (Strongly Breaking Security of Identication Schemes). Let be (K;P;V ) an iden-
tication scheme. We say that A strongly breaks `()-sequential security of (K;P;V ) if for every
n 2 N, Pr
h
WIN(P;V )(K;A;`;n) = 1
i
= 1.
Denition 12 (Basing Weak Security of Identication Schemes on C). We say that R is a black-
box reduction for basing weak `()-sequential security of (K;P;V ) on the hardness of C if R is
a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine, such that for every deterministic machine A that
strongly breaks `()-sequential security of (K;P;V ), there exists a polynomial p() such that for
innitely many n 2 N, RA breaks C with probability 1
p(n) on input 1n.
Theorem 3. Let (K;P;V ) be a unique identication scheme and let C be a standard assumption. If
for every polynomial `() there exists a black-box reduction R for basing weak `()-sequential security
of (K;P;V ) on the hardness of C, then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time machine B and
a polynomial p0() such that for innitely many n 2 N, B breaks C with probability 1
p0(n) on input
1n.
Proof. Consider any unique identication scheme (K;P;V ) and let RL be the unique witness rela-
tion associated with (P;V ). Note that any attacker A that strongly breaks `()-sequential witness
hiding of (P;V ) w.r.t. RL can be easily transformed into an attacker A0 that strongly breaks `()
security of (K;P;V ): Recall that any attacker A that strongly breaks `()-sequential witness hid-
ing of (P;V ) recovers a witness sk 2 RL(pk) for any statement pk that it hears `(jpkj) sequential
accepting proofs of, with probability 1; we can next use the prover algorithm P on input (pk;sk)
to convince V (pk) with probability 1 (this follows by the validity of (K;P;V ) as an identication
scheme). Thus, any black-box reduction R for basing weak `()-sequential security of (K;P;V ) on
the hardness of C can be turned into a black-box reduction for basing weak `()-sequential witness
hiding of (P;V ) w.r.t. RL on the hardness of C. The theorem next follows by applying our main
theorem, since by denition (P;V ) is computationally-special sound with large challenge space and
RL is a unique witness relation.
23Remark 8. (On super-polynomial-time reductions) We note that both the upper and lower bounds
for super-polynomial-time reduction w.r.t witness hiding from Remark 5 directly translate to upper
and lower bounds also with respect to unique identication schemes.
Example 1: Applications to Schnorr's identication scheme: Schnorr's scheme [Sch91] is
based on the discrete logarithm problem in prime order groups: A discrete logarithm parameter
generator D(1n) outputs 1n;p;q;g where 2n 1  p  2n is a prime, q is an l(n) = !(logn) bit
prime such that qjp   1, and g is a generator of a subgroup Gq of Z
p of order q. A description of
the protocol is found in Figure 2.
Schnorr's identification scheme (K;P;V ):
 On input 1n, the key generation algorithm K(1n) outputs the pair (pk;sk), where
pk = (1n;p;q;g;X) is the output of a discrete logarithm generator on input 1n,
X = gx mod p, x 2 Zq, and sk = x.
 The protocol (P;V ) proceeds as follows.
{ P on inputs (pk = (1n;p;q;g;X);sk = x), picks a random u 2 Zq and send
a = gu mod p to V .
{ V on input pk = (1n;p;q;g;X), picks a random c 2 Zq and sends it to the
prover.
{ P computes r = u + cx mod q and sends it to V .
{ V accepts if gr = aXc mod p.
Figure 2: Schnorr's identication scheme [Sch91]
Consider the unique witness relation x 2 RL(1n;p;q;g;X) if and only if 2n 1  p  2n is a
prime, q is a length l(n) prime such that qjp 1, g is a generator of a subgroup Gq of Z
p of order q,
X 2 Gq, and X = gx mod p; let L be the language characterized by RL. Note that the language L
is polynomial-time decidable: Given (1n;p;q;g;X) we can eciently check that p;q are appropriate
primes, that g is a generator of a subgroup Gq of order q, and that X is an element of Gq; the
last two checks amount to checking that both g;X have order q in Z
p which can be done eciently
since q is a prime.17
It is easy to see that (P;V ) is complete for L; furthermore, it is well-known that for \valid"
public-keys pk 2 L, (P;V ) is special-sound (i.e., special-soundness holds for any instance pk that is a
valid public key). However, for invalid public-keys, special-soundness might no longer hold [Bur90].
But we can easily modify (P;V ) into a new scheme (P;V 0) such that special-soundness holds on
all inputs, yet if (P;V ) is a secure identication scheme, then so it (P;V 0). V 0(pk) proceeds just as
V (pk) except that it rst checks that pk 2 L; if the check fails, V 0 simply aborts, and otherwise it
continues just as V .18 It is easy to see that if (K;P;V ) is a secure identication scheme, then so
17To check whether an element y has a prime order q in Z

p, simply check whether y
q = 1 mod p; furthermore,
since Z

p is cyclic, there is a unique subgroup Gq of order q.
18In fact, implementations of Schnorr's protocol often include this check, or require that such a check is performed
when users are registering their public-key.
24is (K;P;V 0) (and in particular, any attacker breaking (K;P;V 0) can be used in a black-box way
to break (K;P;V )). Furthermore, we now have that (P;V 0) is special-sound for L and the witness
relation RL, and has a large challenge space, and so (K;P;V 0) is a unique identication scheme. It
follows from Theorem 3 that the security of (K;P;V 0), and thus also (K;P;V ), cannot be based
on any standard assumption using a Turing reduction.
Example 2: Identication through Parallel GMW Let f be a one-to-one one-way function,
and let K(1n) sample a random x 2 f0;1gn and output (f(x);x). Let x 2 RL(y) if and only if
y = f(x), and let L be the language characterized by RL. Let (P;V ) be any computationally special-
sound argument with large challenge space for L and the unique witness relations RL|for instance,
consider parallelized versions of GMW-G3C, or Blum-HC, implemented with either statistically-
binding or statistically-hiding commitments. (K;P;V ) is a unique identication scheme, and thus
by Theorem 3, its security cannot be based on any standard assumption using Turing reductions.
Example 3: Identication using two secret keys As shown by Feige and Shamir [FS90], if
we slightly change the protocol from Example 2, we can get a secure identication scheme: Let
K(1n) sample random x1;x2 2 f0;1gn and output (f(x1);f(x2);x1); let x 2 RL(y1;y2) if and only
if either y1 = f(x) or y2 = f(x), and let (P;V ) be a parallelized version of GMW-G3C or Blum-HC
proving L with respect to the witness relation RL.
7 Security against Adaptive Selective Decommitment
In this section we investigate commitment schemes secure with respect to adaptive selective decom-
mitment. Our denition follows that of Dwork, Naor, Reingold and Stockmeyer (DNRS) [DNRS03],
but we allow the adversary to adaptively decide what commitments to see openings of; DNRS con-
sidered such a notion in Remark 7.1 in [DNRS03]. We next remark that if implementing the
commitment scheme in GMW-G3C with commitments secure under adaptive selective decommit-
ment, then the resulting protocol is witness hiding under sequential composition for unique witness
relations. Finally, we use our main theorem to prove limitations of basing commitments secure
against adaptive selective decommitment on standard assumptions.
Let us rst briey recall the notion of a commitment scheme.
7.1 Commitments
Commitment protocols allow a sender to commit itself to a value while keeping it secret from
the receiver; this property is called hiding. At a later time, the commitment can only be opened
to a single value as determined during the commitment protocol; this property is called binding.
Commitment schemes come in two dierent avors, statistically binding and statistically hiding;
below we sketch the properties of a statistically binding commitment; full denitions can be found
in [Gol01]. In statistically binding commitments, the binding property holds against unbounded
adversaries, while the hiding property only holds against computationally bounded (non-uniform)
adversaries. The statistical-binding property asserts that, with overwhelming probability over the
randomness of the receiver, the transcript of the interaction fully determines the value committed
to by the sender. The computational-hiding property guarantees that commitments to any two
dierent values are computationally indistinguishable.
Non-interactive statistically-binding commitment schemes can be constructed using any one-to-
one one-way function (see Section 4.4.1 of [Gol01]). Allowing some minimal interaction (in which
25the receiver rst sends a single random initialization message), statistically-binding commitment
schemes can be obtained from any one-way function [Nao91, HILL99].
As in [DNRS03], we here focus on non-interactive commitments C(;)|where the rst input
is the value v and the second input is the randomness used by the committer|but just as in
their treatment, our treatment directly extends to two-round commitments (i.e., \families" of non-
interactive commitments). For completeness, let us provide the denition of statsitically-binding
and computationally hiding non-interactive commitments.
Denition 13. We say that C(;) is a non-interactive commitment scheme if C is a determinis-
tic algorithm whose running-time is polynomial in the length of the rst input, and the following
conditions hold.
 (Validity) There exists a polynomial p() such that for any n 2 N, any v 2 f0;1gn;r 2
f0;1gp(n), C(v;r) 6= ?.
 (Binding) For any v;v0;r;r0 2 f0;1g such that v 6= v0, if c = C(v;r) = C(v0;r0), then c = ?.
 (Hiding) The following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable
{ fC(v)gn2N;v2f0;1gn;v02f0;1gn
{ fC(v0)gn2N;v2f0;1gn;v02f0;1gn
where C(v) denotes the output of C(v;r) where r is a uniformly selected random tape of length
p(jvj).
7.2 Dening adaptive selective decommitment security
Let C(;) be a non-interactive commitment scheme, and D = fDngn2N be an ensemble of distri-
butions. We compare between a \real" and an \ideal" execution. In the \real" experiment, the
adversary gets to see m(n) commitments to values v1;:::;vm sampled from some distribution Dn,
and may adaptively ask for decommitments of any commitment ci where i is part of the \legal"
set I. In the \ideal" experiment, the adversary simply gets to (adaptively) ask for the values vi for
any i 2 I. Let real(C;D;f;I;A;n) denote the output of the following experiment:
 Sample (~ x;z) from Dn. For each i 2 j~ xj, let ci = C(xi;ri) where r is a uniform random string
(of the appropriate length). Feed (1n;~ c;z) to A.
 Iterate the following until A halts: whenever A outputs a message i, if i 2 I, feed the
decommitment (xi;ri) to S.
 Finally, output 1 if the nal output of A equals f(~ x) and 0 otherwise.
Let ideal(D;f;I;S;n) denote the output of the following experiment:
 Sample (~ x;z) from Dn. Feed (1n;z) to S.
 Iterate the following until S halts: whenever A outputs a message i, if i 2 I, feed xi to S.
 Finally, output 1 if the nal output of A equals f(~ x) and 0 otherwise.
26Denition 14 (Adaptive Selective Decommitment Security). Let C(;) be a commitment scheme.
We say that C(;) is secure under adaptive selective decommitment w.r.t the legal set I = fIngn2N
where In  [m(n)] and the ensemble of distributions D = fDng, where Dn is a distribution
over (f0;1gpoly(n))m(n), if for every polynomial-time computable function f, every probabilistic
polynomial-time adversary A, every polynomial p(), there exists a polynomial-time algorithm S
such that for all n 2 N,
Pr[ideal(D;f;In;S;n)]  Pr[real(C;D;f;In;A;n) = 1]  
1
p(n)
Remark 9. We note that our denition is a slight relaxation of an \adaptive" variant of the
notion of selective-decommitment security with respect to functions of [DNRS03]. We remark that
[DNRS03] also consider stronger \simulation-based" notions of security; since we are proving a
lower bound, we focus on the weaker notion of security with respect to functions.
7.3 Instantiating GMW
We say that an ensemble D = fDngn2N of distributions over RL with auxiliary input is hard if for
every adversary A whose running-time is polynomial in the length of its rst input, there exists a
negligible function  such that the probability that A(x;z) outputs w 2 RL(x) is at most (n),
where x;y;z are chosen according to Dn.
Let RL be a unique witness relation and let L be the language characterized by RL. Let us
denote by Para-GMWL the \parallelized" version of GMW's graph 3 coloring protocol for proving
the language L|that is, the protocol obtained by suciently repeating GMW-G3C in parallel to
get a protocol with large challenge space (and thus negligible soundness error). For simplicity (just
as in [DNRS03]), we consider a slightly modied version of GMW-G3C where we ensure that the
witness used by the prover can be eciently decoded from the values committed to by the honest
prover.
Proposition 3. Consider Para-GMWL instantiated with a commitment scheme C(;) that is secure
under adaptive selective decommitment for any legal set I = fIngn2N where In  [m(n)], and
any eciently computable ensemble of distributions D = fDng, where Dn is a distribution over
(f0;1gpoly(n))m(n). Then for every polynomial-time computable hard ensemble D0 over RL (with
auxiliary information), Para-GMWL is witness hiding under sequential composition w.r.t. D;RL.
Proof. The proof closely follows the original proof by DNRS showing that Para-GMWL is \semantically-
secure for functions" (see [DNRS03] for more details); this notion implies single-instance witness
hiding for unique witness relations. However, since we are considering commitment schemes se-
cure against adaptive selective decommitment (instead of non-adaptive selective decommitment as
DNRS), we can show that the protocol in fact also is witness hiding under sequential composition.
Assume that there exists a hard ensemble D and an adversary A that can break witness hiding
under `() sequential repetitions of Para-GMWL w.r.t. D;RL. We let D0 = fD0
ng be an ensembles
where D0
n is dened as follows: sample (x;y;z) from Dn, output (~ v;(x;z)) where ~ v are the values the
honest prover would commit to in `(jxj) executions of Para-GMWL on input (x;y). Let fGMW
L (~ v)
be the function that \decodes" the values ~ v to the witness w (and outputs ? if the values do not
dene a valid witness). Let IGMW
L = fIngn2I, where In is the set of indexes denoting legal openings
to the `(n) executions of the GMW protocol|i.e., for each \chunk" of commitments corresponding
to a single execution, we may only open 2 commitments.
Now, consider any attack on witness hiding under `() sequential execution on Para-GMWL
w.r.t. D;RL. Any such attack can be viewed as an attack on adaptive selective decommitment on
27C w.r.t D0, the function fGMW
L and the legal set IGMW
L . As in [DNRS03], the key point is that in
the ideal experiment, the openings to any legal set can be perfectly simulated (by simply picking
two random colors for each execution). So, in the ideal experiment, the function fGMW
L cannot be
computed except with negligible probability (since by denition D0 is hard); it follows that also in
the real experiment f can only be computed with negligible probability, which concludes that A
can only recover the (unique) witness with negligible probability.
7.4 Limits of Adaptive-Selective Decommitment Security
By combining Proposition 3 with Theorem 2, we get as a corollary that, assuming the existence
of an eciently computable hard ensemble over an NP-relation RL with unique witnesses (i.e.,
a one-to-one one-way function), adaptive selective decommitment secure commitments cannot be
based on any standard assumption using a Turing reduction.
We proceed to formalize this, while considering a very weak notion of selective decommitment
security.
Denition 15 (Strongly Breaking Adaptive Selective-Decommitment). We say that A strongly
breaks adaptive selective decommitment of C(; _ ) w.r.t D, the legal set I = fIngn2N and the function
f, if for every n 2 N, Pr[real(C;D;f;In;A;n) = 1] = 1.
Denition 16 (Basing Weak Adaptive Selective-Decommitment Hiding on C). We say that R is
a black-box reduction for basing weak adaptive selective-decommitment hiding of C(; _ ) w.r.t D, the
legal set I = fIngn2N and the function f, on the hardness of C, if R is a probabilistic polynomial-
time oracle machine and there exists a polynomial p(), such that for every deterministic machine A
that strongly breaks adaptive selective decommitment of C w.r.t. to D;I;f we have that for innitely
many n 2 N, RA breaks C with probability 1
p(n).
We now show that, assuming the existence one-to-one one-way functions, for any polynomial
r(), there exists (eciently computable) D;I;f such that we cannot base weak adaptive selective
decommitment hiding of C w.r.t., D;I;f on any r()-round assumption C. Note that merely show-
ing the existence of such D;I;f is trivial|if the legal set I allows a polynomial-time adversary to
compute f, even in the \ideal" experiment, then obviously we cannot base hiding on any assump-
tion. The diculty is to exhibit D;I;f such that f cannot be computed in the ideal experiment, yet
adaptive selective decommitment hiding of C w.r.t. D;I;f still cannot be based on any standard
assumption.
To formalize this, we say that f is hard for D = fDngn2N, I = fIngn2N if for all polynomial-
time A, there exists a negligible function () such that for all n 2 N, Pr[ideal(Dn;f;In;A;n)] 
(n).
Theorem 4. Assume the existence of a one-to-one one-way function. Then for any polynomial
r(), there exists an eciently computable ensemble D, an eciently recognizable legal set I, and
an eciently computable function f that is hard for D;I, such that if weak adaptive selective
decommitment hiding of C w.r.t D;I;f can be based on the hardness of any r()-round assumption
C, then there exists a machine B and a polynomial p(), such that for innitely many n 2 N, B
breaks C with probability 1
p(n).
Proof. Let g be a one-to-one one-way function let RL be the unique witness relation where (x;w) 2
RL if and only if g(w) = x, and let L be the language characterized by RL. Let D = fDngn2N,
28where Dn is the distribution obtained by sampling X;Z as follows; let X be the values ~ v that
the honest prover in Para-GMWL commits to on input (x;w) in `(jxj) executions where `(n0) =
!(n0+2r(n0)+1), and where is w is a random n-bit string and x = g(w); let Z = x. Let f = fGMW
L
and I = IGMW
L , dened in the proof of Proposition 3. It easily follows from the same argument as in
the proof Proposition 3 that f is hard for D;I. Observe that any adversary A that strongly breaks
`()-sequential witness hiding of Para-GMWL w.r.t. RL, also strongly breaks adaptive selective
decommitment security of C w.r.t. D;I;f. Thus, any reduction R from breaking an r()-round
assumption C to strongly breaking adaptive selective decommitment of C w.r.t. D;I;f, is also a
reduction from breaking C to strongly breaking `()-sequential witness hiding of Para-GMWL w.r.t.
RL. The theorem next follows by applying the quantitative version of Theorem 2 stated in Remark
3.
Remark 10. (On super-polynomial-time reductions) We remark that if considering statistically-
binding commitment schemes, the above argument combined with Remark 5 directly rules out using
also T()-time reductions, where T(n) = 2n: We just need to let Para-GMWL consist of n2 (where
n is the length of the common input) parallel repetitions of GMW-G3C to ensure that the protocol
has a suciently large challenge space.
On the other hand, for computationally binding schemes, super-polynomial-time reductions are
useful. Consider a (two-round) statistically hiding scheme of but with a scaled down security pa-
rameter ensuring that correctly distributed openings to any value can be found in quasi-polynomial
time. For such commitments, we can easily simulate both commitments and openings to arbitrary
values in quasi-polynomial time. Thus, they satify adaptive selective decommitment security with a
quasi-polynomial simulator S.
Remark 11. (On encryption schemes secure against selective decryption) We mention that Bellare,
Hofheinz and Yilek [BHY09] have recently shown the existence of encryption schemes secure against
selective decryption based on standard type assumptions. We refer the reader to [BHY09] for a
formal denition of selective decryption security. The reason our lower bounds do not extend to
encryption schemes is the fact that encryption schemes do not neccesarily have to be commiting
for all public keys|that is, there exists some public keys for which the encryption of a message m
does not uniquely determine m.
On the other hand, if we restrict to commiting encryption schemes then our lower bounds directly
extend to rule out security against adaptive selective decryption (based on standard assumptions).
Consider, for instance, the ElGamal encryption scheme [Gam84]. It is well know that this scheme
is committing, so if it is secure against adaptive selective decryption, it yields a non-interactive
commitment secure against adaptive selective decommitment.
8 Security of Generalized One-more Inversion Assumptions
In this section we show limitations of basing generalized \one-more" assumptions on standard
assumption using Turing reductions.
Let us start by recalling the one-more discrete logarithm assumption [BNPS03, BP02]. Recall
that a discrete logarithm parameter generator D(1n) outputs 1n;p;q;g where 2n 1  p  2n is a
prime, q is a length l(n) = !(logn) prime such that qjp   1, and g is a generator of a subgroup
Gq of Z
p of order q. The one-more discrete logarithm assumption states that no polynomial-time
algorithm A can, given the output 1n;p;q;g of a discrete logarithm generator, and `(n) target
values y1 = gx1 mod p;:::;y`(n) = gx`(n) mod p, where x1;:::;x`(n) are uniformly picked from Zq
29and `() is a polynomial, recover x1;:::;x`(n) with non-negligible probability, even if A has access
to `(n)   1 oracle queries to a discrete logarithm oracle for Gq;g.
Let us formalize this assumption in the language of witness hiding. Let D be a discrete logarithm
generator. Let us dene a witness relation RL, an ensemble of distributions D` over RL with
auxiliary input, and an interactive proof (P;V ).
 Let (x1;:::;x`(n)) 2 RL((1n;p;q;g);y1;:::;y`(n)) if and only if (1n;p;q;g) are valid discrete
logarithm parameters (as mentioned in Section 6 this can be checked eciently), and if
y1;:::yn are in a subgroup Gq of order q (again, as mentioned in Section 6 this can be
checked eciently), and for every i 2 [`(n)], yi = gxi mod p. Note that this is a unique
witness relation. Let L be the language characterized by RL; note that this language is
polynomial-time decidable.
 Let D`
n output (X;Y;Z), obtained as follows: let (1n;p;q;g) be the output of D(1n); uniformly
pick `(n) elements x1;:::;x`(n) 2 Zq, for i 2 [`(n)], let yi = gxi mod p; nally let X =
((1n;p;q;g);y1;:::;y`(n));Y = (x1;:::;x`(n)), and let Z simply be empty (i.e., there is no
auxiliary information).
 Now consider the protocol (P;V ) dened in Figure 3.
A discrete logarithm challenge protocol (P;V ):
On common input X = ((1n;p;q;g);y1;:::;y`(n)), the prover P and verier V proceed
as follows.
{ V rst checks that X 2 L; if not, it aborts (rejecting). Otherwise, V picks a random
y 2 Gq and sends it to the prover, where Gq denotes the order q subgroup of Z
p
generated by g.
{ P checks that y 2 Gq and if so, it computes an x such that gx = y and send it to
the verier.
{ V accepts if and only if gx = y.
Figure 3: A discrete logarithm challenge protocol
The one-more discrete logarithm assumption with respect to the discrete logarithm parameter
generator D can now be stated as the assumption that:
For evert polynomial `, (P;V ) is (`()   1)-sequentially witness hiding w.r.t D` =
fD`
ngn2N, RL.
Let us now show that the assumption that (P;V ) is witness hiding under `(n) (where  > 0)
sequential repetitions w.r.t D`;RL cannot be based on any standard assumption using a Turing
reduction, for suciently large `(). That is, even a \many-more" variant of the discrete logarithm
assumption cannot be based on standard assumptions using a Turing reduction.
Denition 17 (Strongly Breaking Many-More Security of DLOG). Let (P;V ) and RL be as dened
above. We say that A strongly breaks the (`;)-many-more DLOG assumption if A strongly breaks
`-sequential witness hiding of (P;V ) w.r.t. RL.
30Denition 18 (Basing Weak Many-More Security of DLOG on C). We say that R is a black-
box reduction for basing weak (`;)-many-more security of DLOG on the hardness of C if R is
a probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine, such that for every deterministic machine A that
strongly breaks the (`;)-many-more DLOG assumption, there exists a polynomial p() such that for
innitely many n 2 N, RA break C with probability 1
p(n) on input 1n.
Theorem 5. Let C be a standard assumption, and  > 0. If for every suciently large polynomial
`() there exists a black-box reduction R for basing weak (`;)-many-more security of DLOG on the
hardness of C, then there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time machine B and a polynomial p0()
such that for innitely many n 2 N, B breaks C with probability 1
p0(n) on input 1n.
Proof. We transform the protocol (P;V ) into a protocol (P;V 0) that satises the generalized notion
of computational special-soundness. V 0 proceeds just as V , except that instead of picking the
challenge y at random in Gq, it picks a random i 2 [`(n)], r 2 Z
p, and computes the challenge y as
y = yr
i. The complete description of protocol (P;V 0) is found in Figure 4.
A modified discrete logarithm challenge protocol (P;V 0):
On common input X = ((1n;p;q;g);y1;:::;y`(n)), the prover P and verier V 0 proceed
as follows.
 V 0 rst checks that X 2 L; if not, it aborts (rejecting). Otherwise, it picks a
random i 2 [`(n)], r 2 Z
p, and computes the challenge y as y = yr
i and sends it to
the prover.
 P checks that y 2 Gq and if so, it computes an x such that gx = y and send it to
the verier.
 V 0 accepts if and only if gx = y.
Figure 4: A modied discrete logarithm challenge protocol
Clearly, if (P;V ) is (sequentially) witness hiding for some distribution, then so is (P;V 0) as we
have only changed the verier strategy; additionally, it is easy to see that (P;V 0) still has perfect
completeness.
Below we show that (P;V 0) satises the generalized notion of computational special-soundness
with large challenge space. Since RL is a unique witness relation, we can then apply the quantitative
version of Theorem 2 stated in Remark 3 to conclude that there is no Turing reduction from
recovering x1;:::;x`(n) after `(n) sequential interactions of (P;V ) to any standard assumption, as
long as `(n) is suciently big.
Proposition 4. (P;V 0) is a generalized computationally special-sound argument with large chal-
lenge space for L and the witness relation RL.
Proof. We show that (P;V 0) satises the denition of generalized special-soundness when the poly-
nomial m(n) = `(n)n; that is, extraction can be performed from m(n) = `(n)n accepting verier
views. Note that for every accepting answer x to a challenge y generated as y = yr
i, we can recover
xi as xi = xr 1 mod q; we say that any such view V solves index i. Our extractor X, on input
m(n) accepting verier views ~ V0, checks if every index i 2 [`(n)] is solved by some view V 2 ~ V0, and
if so it applies the above method to recover and output x1;:::;x`(n).
31Let us now argue that for every polynomial p(n), given p(n) verier views ~ V generated as in
the denition of computational special-soundness, it holds that, except with negligible probability,
if ~ V contains m(n) accepting views, then X(~ V0) (where ~ V0 are the rst `(n)n accepting views in
~ V) succeeds in recovering x1;:::;x`(n). To show this, we just need to argue that, except with
negligible probability, for every i 2 [`(n)], there exists some view V 2 ~ V0 that solves index i. Since
the distribution of a challenge y generated as y = yr
i is independent of i, we have that for every
j 2 [m(n)], the probability that the j'th accepting view solves index i is 1
`(n). So, if we have
m(n) = `(n)n accepting views, it holds that for every i 2 [`(n)], the probability that index i is not
solved by any of the views in ~ V0 is negligible; thus, by the union bound, it holds that, whenever
we have m(n) accepting views ~ V0, then, except with negligible probability, all indexes are solved
by some view V 2 ~ V0 and thus X(~ V0) recovers a witness. This concludes that (P;V ) satised the
generalized notion of computational special-soundness. Clearly it also has large challenge space.
Remark 12. (On super-polynomial-time reductions) By appealing to the super-polynomial version
of our main theorem in Remark 5, Theorem 5 directly extends to rule out also using super-polynomial
reductions as long as the size of the prime q is suciently big (as the protocols described above are
special-sound also for unbounded attackers).
Also note that if q is not suciently big, then inversion can be done by brute force, so the
inversion oracle can be simulated \for free".
8.1 Extensions to homomorphic certied permutations
There is nothing special about the discrete logarithm problem. The proof of Theorem 5 works as
long as we consider any additive-homomorphic19 family of certied permutations: that is, 1) there
exists an ecient algorithm for determining whether the selected function indeed is a permutation,
and 2) elements in the domain of the function are eciently recognizable. We simply need to
consider the protocol in Figure 5. It follows using exactly the same proof as in Theorem 5 that
the above protocol is computationally special-sound for a unique witness relation|the key points
are that 1) given the inverse x to a challenge y = f(xi + r) and randomness r, we can compute xi;
and, 2) by the permutation property of f, the distribution of y = f(xi + r) where r is randomly
chosen is independent of i. Thus, by the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 5, \many-more"
inversion security cannot be based on any standard assumption using Turing reductions.
Let us give an example of this generalized version. Consider the one-more RSA assumption
[BNPS03]: It asserts that no polynomial-time algorithm A, given a product N of two random n-bit
primes and an exponent e, can nd RSA inverses (i.e., inverses to the function fN;e(m) = me
mod N) to `(n) random target values y1;:::y`(n) 2 Z
N, where `() is an arbitrary polynomial, even
if A can access an inversion oracle for fN;e, `(n)   1 times. We here focus on the the case when
e > N is a prime; let us call this the \certied" one-more RSA assumption. For typical applications
of the one-more RSA assumption (e.g, to prove the security of Chaum's blind signature scheme
[Cha82]) this restriction on the exponent e is needed (see e.g., [CNS07]). This restriction ensures
that valid exponents e are eciently recognizable; for every such valid exponent e we are guaranteed
that the function fN;e = xe mod N is a permutation. Furthermore, given N and an element y, it
is easy to determine whether y 2 Z
N. We can thus directly apply the above proof to conclude that
19That is, permutations f for which there exists an ecient algorithm that on input the f(x1);f(x2) and the
description of f can compute f(x1 + x2))
32An inversion challenge protocol (P;V 0):
On common input X = ((1n;f);y1;:::;y`(n)), the prover P and verier V 0 proceed as
follows.
 V 0 rst checks that f is a permutation of the \appropriate length" w.r.t n (i.e.,
we need to check that the domain of the function is super polynomial); if not, it
aborts (rejecting). Otherwise, it picks a random i 2 [`(n)], and a random r in the
domain of f, and homomorphically computes the challenge y = f(xi + r); since f
is homomorphic we only need to know yi and r to do this.
 P checks that y is in the range (which equals the domain) of f and if so, it computes
an x such that f(x) = y and send it to the verier.
 V 0 accepts if and only if f(x) = y.
Figure 5: An inversion challenge protocol
\many-more" variants of the \certied" RSA problem cannot be based on standard assumption
using Turing reduction.
9 Security of Unique Blind Signatures
In this section we investigate blind signature schemes [Cha82]. Roughly speaking, blind signatures
allow a user to ask a signer S to sign a message m, while keeping the message m secret from S.
Consider Chaum's classic Blind signature [Cha82]. The scheme is non-interactive: the client on
input a message m and a public-key pk sends a single message y to the signer, and the signer (on
input its secret-key sk) replies with a single message x; the client next can compute a signature
 for m. This scheme also has the following desirable feature: There exists a unique accepting
signature  for a message m given the public key pk. Let us call schemes satisfying the above
properties unique non-interactive blind signatures. More precisely,
Denition 19 (Unique Non-interactive Blind Signature). We say that a tuple of probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms (Gen;Ver;Sign;Blind;Unblind) is a unique non-interactive blind signa-
ture if the following conditions hold:
 (Validity) For every n 2 N, every (pk;sk) 2 Gen(1n), every m 2 f0;1gn, every random tape
r 2 f0;1g1, every  2 Unblindr(pk;m;Sign(sk;Blindr(pk;m))), Ver(pk;m;) = 1.
 (Computational Blinding) The following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable
{ fpk;Blind(pk;m0)gn2N;pk2f0;1g;m0;m12f0;1gn
{ fpk;Blind(pk;m1)gn2N;pk2f0;1g;m0;m12f0;1gn
 (Uniqueness) For every pk 2 f0;1g, every m 2 f0;1g, there exists at most one  2 f0;1g
such that Ver(pk;m;) = 1.
33Unique signatures were rst dened by Goldwasser and Ostrovsky [GO92], and rst achieved by
Micali, Rabin and Vadhan [MRV99].20 As far as we know, Camenisch, Neven and Shelat [CNS07]
were the rst to dene unique blind signatures, and to point out that e.g., Chaum's blind signature
is unique; Camenisch et al also note that a non-interactive blind scheme by Boldyreva [Bol03] is
unique.
We mention that many blind signature schemes (including both Chaum's and Boldyreva's
schemes) satisfy the stronger notion of perfect blinding: for every public-key pk, and any two mes-
sages m;m0 2 f0;1gn, Blind(pk;m) is identically distributed to Blind(pk;m0). As we shall shortly
see, our lower bound will be even stronger for signatures satisfying perfect blinding.
Let us turn to dening unforgeability. The notion of \one-more" unforgeability [PS00] requires
that no polynomial-time algorithm can output more signatures than the number of blind signatures
it has requested.
Denition 20 (One-more Unforgeability). We say that a unique non-interactive blind signature
is one-more unforgeable if for every polynomial-time algorithm A, there exists a negligible function
 such that for every n 2 N, the probability that A wins in the following experiment is bounded
by (n): Sample (pk;sk) using Gen(1n) and let A(1n;pk) get oracle access to Sign(sk;); A is said
to win if it manages to output ` valid message-signature pairs (m;) such that Ver(pk;m;) = 1,
while having made less than ` oracle queries.
Let us formalize a weaker notion of unforgeability in the language of witness hiding. We consider
a setting where the goal of the attacker is to nd signatures on `(n) random messages that are a
priori xed before it gets to talk to the signer.
Let  = (Gen;Ver;Sign;Blind;Unblind) be a unique non-interactive blind signature scheme. We
dene a witness relation R
;`
L , an ensemble of distributions D;` over R
;`
L with auxiliary input, and
an interactive proof (P;V ).
 Let (1;:::;`(n)) 2 R
;`
L ((1n;pk);m1;:::;m`(n)) if and only if for every i 2 [`(n)], Ver(pk;mi;i) =
1, and let L;` be the language characterized by R
;`
L . Note that by the unique signature re-
quirement, R
;`
L is a unique witness relation.
 Let D
;`
n output (X;Y;Z), obtained as follows: let (pk;sk) be the output of Gen(1n); uni-
formly pick `(n) elements m1;:::;m`(n) 2 f0;1gn, for i 2 [`(n)], let
i = Unblindr(pk;m;Sign(sk;Blindr(pk;m)))
where r is a suciently long uniform random string; nally, let X = ((1n;pk);m1;:::;m`(n));Y =
1;:::;`(n), and Z simply be empty (i.e., there is no auxiliary information).
 Now consider the protocol (P;V ) dened in Figure 6.
Clearly any attacker on (`(n)   1)-sequential witness hiding of (P;` ;V ) w.r.t D;`;R
;`
L breaks
unforgeability of (Gen;Ver;Sign;Blind;Unblind). Let us now show that the assumption that (P;V )
is witness hiding under `(n) sequential repetitions w.r.t D;`;R
;`
L cannot be based on any standard
assumption using a Turing reduction, for suciently large `(). That is, even a \many-more" notion
of unforgeability for a priori xed random messages, cannot be based on standard assumptions using
a Turing reduction.
20The work of Goldwasser and Ostrovsky only provided a construction of unique signatures in the Common Ref-
erence String model.
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On common input X = ((1n;pk);m1;:::;m`(n)), the prover P and verier V  proceed
as follows.
{ V  rst checks that all mi have length n; if not, it aborts (rejecting). Otherwise, if it
picks a random i 2 [`(n)], a uniform random string r, and sends y = Blindr(pk;mi)
to the prover.
{ P computes (using brute-force) a secret key sk such that (pk;sk) is in the range
of D(1n) and replies with x = Sign(sk;y).
{ V  computes  = Unblindr(pk;mi;x) and accepts if and only if Ver(pk;mi;) = 1.
Figure 6: Protocol (P;V ): A witness hiding protocol from the blind signature scheme .
Denition 21 (Strongly Breaking Unforgeability). We say A strongly breaks (`;)-unforgeability
of the blind signature scheme  if A strongly breaks `-sequential witness hiding of (P;V ) w.r.t.
R
;`
L .
Denition 22 (Basing Weak Unforgeability on C). We say that R is a black-box reduction for
basing weak (`;)-unforgeability of  on the hardness of C if R is a probabilistic polynomial-time
oracle machine, such that for every deterministic machine A that strongly breaks (`;)-unforgeability
of , there exists a polynomial p() such that for innitely many n 2 N, RA breaks C with probability
1
p(n) on input 1n.
Theorem 6. Let  be a unique non-interactive blind signature scheme, let C be a standard assump-
tion, and let  > 0. If for every suciently large polynomial `() there exists a black-box reduction
R for basing weak (`;)-unforgeability of  on the hardness of C, then there exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time machine B and a polynomial p0() such that for innitely many n 2 N, B breaks
C with probability 1
p0(n) on input 1n.
Proof. To show the theorem, we show that (P;V ) satises the generalized notion of computa-
tional special-soundness. Since R
;`
L is a unique witness relation, we can then apply the quantitative
version of Theorem 2 stated in Remark 3 to conclude that there is no Turing reduction from re-
covering the signatures 1;:::;`(n) after `(n) sequential interactions of (P;V ) to any standard
assumption, as long as `(n) is suciently big.
Proposition 5. (P;V ) is a generalized computationally special-sound argument with large chal-
lenge space for L and the witness relation RL.
Proof. First, note that (P;V 
) is complete (but does not have an ecient prover strategy); this
follows directly by the validity requirement in the denition of a blind signature. The rest of the
proof is very similarly to the proof of Proposition 4 but requires some additional care to deal with
the fact that blindness is only computational and not perfect.
We show that (P;V ) satises the denition of generalized special-soundness when the poly-
nomial m(n) = `(n)n; that is, extraction can be performed from m(n) = `(n)n accepting verier
views. Note that for every accepting answer x to a challenge y generated as y = Blindr(pk;mi), we
recover a signature i for mi; we say that a verier view V solves index i whenever it contains such
35a challenge-response pair. Our extractor X, on input m(n) accepting verier views ~ V0, checks if ~ V0
contains views that solve every index i 2 [`(n)]; if so, it recovers (using the above procedure) and
outputs all the signatures 1;:::;`(n).
Let us now argue that for every polynomial p(n), given p(n) verier views ~ V generated as in the
denition of computational special-soundness, it holds that the probability that ~ V contains m(n)
accepting views and X(~ V0) (where ~ V0 are the rst `(n)n accepting views in ~ V) fails in recovering
signatures on all of m1;:::;m`(n), is negligible.
Towards this, let us rst consider a simplied case where the blinding property is perfect. In
this case we can apply exactly the same proof as in Proposition 4: Since the distribution of a
challenge x = Blind(pk;mi) is independent of i, we have that for every j 2 [m(n)], the probability
that the j'th accepting view solves index i is 1
`(n). So, if we have m(n) = `(n)n accepting views, it
holds that for every i 2 [`(n)], the probability that index i is not solved by any view, is negligible;
thus, by the union bound, it holds that whenever we have m(n) accepting views ~ V0, then except
with negligible probability, all indexes are solved by some view V 2 ~ V0. This concludes that in the
simplied \perfect blinding" case, the probability that ~ V contains m(n) accepting views and X(~ V0)
fails, is negligible.
Let us now turn to the more general case where the blinding property is only computational.
It follows using a hybrid argument based on the indistinguishability of Blind that also in this case
the probability that ~ V contains m(n) accepting views and X(~ V0) fails is negligible. Formally, this
is shown by considering a mental experiment where the verier challenges are generated using the
following procedure ~ V : ~ V picks a random i 2 [`(n)] (just as V ), but lets x = Blind(pk;m0) (instead
of Blind(pk;mi) as V would have computed it). We now say that a view V solves index i if in the
view V, ~ V picked indexed i. It follows using the proof of the perfect blinding case that in this
mental experiment, the probability that ~ V contains m(n) accepting views and yet there exists some
index that is not solved by any view V 2 ~ V0, is negligible. We can now apply the computational
blinding property to conclude that this is still the case when we generate verier challenges using
V instead of ~ V .
This concludes that (P;V ) satised the generalized notion of computational special-soundness.
Clearly it also has large challenge space.
Example 1: Chaum's Blind Signature Scheme. For concreteness, we recall Chaum's blind
signature scheme in Figure 7. As noted by Camenisch, Shelat and Neven [CNS07], it is easy to
see that this scheme is unique (since the function fN;e = me mod N is a permutation whenever
e > N is a prime), and furthermore perfectly blinding. Thus, by Theorem 6, weak unforgeability of
Chaum's signature scheme cannot be based on any standard assumption using a Turing reduction.
As mentioned above, Camenisch, Shelat and Neven also note that a scheme due to Boldyreva
[Bol03] is unique, and thus by Theorem 6, unforgeability of this scheme cannot be based on any
standard assumption, using a Turing reduction.
Example 2: Blind signatures from fully homomorphic encryption (this example is
joint work with Huijia Lin) Consider the following natural (folklore?) approach for construct-
ing a non-interactive unique blind signature scheme. Generate a key pair (pk;sk) for a unique
signature scheme (constructions of such scheme are known from \standard assumptions"; see
[MRV99, Lys02]); let (pk;sk) be the key pair for the blind signature. To request a signature
on the message m, the user generates a public-secret key pair (pkfhe;skfhe) for a fully homomorphic
36Chaum's blind signature scheme (Gen;Sign;Ver;Blind;Unblind):
 Gen(1n) samples two n-bit primes p;q, lets N = pq, samples a prime e > N, and
outputs (pk = (N;e);sk = (N;d)) where d = e 1 mod (p   1)(q   1).a
 Blindr((N;e);m) checks that N is of length 2jmj and that e > N is a prime; if
not it outputs ?, otherwise it interprets the random coins r as an element in Z
N
and outputs y = hN(m)re where hN is some appropriate \hash-function" mapping
elements from f0;1gn to elements in Z
N.
 Sign((N;d);y) outputs x = yd mod N if y 2 Z
N and ? otherwise.
 Unblindr((N;e);m;x) outputs  = x=r (where r is again interpreted as an element
in Z
N).
 Ver((N;e);m;) outputs 1 if and only if e = hN(m) mod N and e > N is a prime.
aSome descriptions of Chaum's blind signature scheme do not insist that e > N is a prime. But it is
well-known that the scheme is not blind unless we make this restriction. See e.g., [CNS07].
Figure 7: Chaum's blind signature scheme [Cha82]
encryption scheme, encrypts m under pkfhe, and sends the ciphertext c to the signer. The signer
homomorphically computes an encrypted signature ^  on m (using c;pkfhe and sk) and sends it
back to the user. The user recovers the signature  by decrypting ^  using skfhe. This scheme is a
unique non-interactive blind signature scheme assuming the fully homomorphic encryption scheme
is semantically secure. Thus by Theorem 6, weak unforgeability of this scheme cannot be based on
any standard assumptions using a Turing reduction.
Remark 13. (On super-polynomial-time reductions) Just as our main theorem, Theorem 6 directly
extends to rule out also using super-polynomial reductions, as long as the blindness property holds
for appropriately strong adversaries, and as long as the length of the messages that can be signed
is suciently long. In particular, this means that even sub-exponential reductions cannot be used
to prove Chaum's scheme unforgeable since the scheme is perfectly blinding.
On the other hand, consider the blind signature scheme from Example 2. If assuming that the
underlying unique signature scheme is unforgeable for time, say 2n
for some  > 0, but the fully
homomorphic encryption scheme can be broken in time nlogn (e.g., by scaling down the security
parameter), then it is not hard to show that the resulting scheme actually is unforgeable, and this
can be proven using a quasi-polynomial-time black-box reduction|the reduction simply \breaks" the
blinded signing request by the attacker, recovering the message m to be signed, and forwards m to
the signer of the underlying unique signature scheme.
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